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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I critically review the major theories of modem mass 
surveillance for the purpose of contributing to the developing field of 
critical surveillance studies. This has meant firstly, assessing the influential 
liberal/privacy perspectives on surveillance and the theoretically adjacent 
organisational control approach in order to show how they have shaped the 
great majority of surveillance studies around perspectives which not only 
fail, on their own terms, to adequately understand the purposes and effects 
of contemporary surveillance practices but also effectively obscure how the 
staging of surveillance is deeply implicated in the expansion of capitalist 
accumulation and the related restructuring of social control. 
Secondly, I review the radical perspectives on surveillance in order to 
illustrate how emerging techniques of highly sophisticated 
informationalised surveillance, operated by new combinations of corporate 
actors, is allowing the re-ordering of patterns of social behaviour around 
the evolving sectoral needs of late capitalism. In this, I pay particular 
attention to the explosive, and highly revealing, area of consumer 
surveillance. 
Finally, I examine recent theories of the social disciplinary effects of 
electronic panopticism which are derived from Foucault's important studies 
of surveillance-based institutional discipline. Modern electronic 
panopticism is being soundly theorised but as yet there have been no studies 
which explore the concrete application of discipline in particular social and 
technological contexts. Without attempting to remedy this here, I finish 
with an attempt to show, through the example of electronic funds transfer, 
how an increasingly global architecture of communication and information 
is being utilised in order to produce precise disciplinary effects. In this 
case, for the inciting, directing, sorting, and correct performing of 
consumption in Une with the changing needs of accumulation. An example 
which may provide insight into wider developments of surveillance under 
late capitalism. 
Introduction 
It has become a truism to maintain that the primary danger of 
computerised surveillance is its threat to individual privacy. After all 
such an assertion hardly comes as a surprise, for few citizens are free 
from the growing web of information gathering which punctuates 
nearly every aspect of their daily lives. Furthermore, few citizens are 
aware of the existence or content of the hidden reservoirs of personal 
information held by state and private organisations with which they 
must routinely deal. Nor are they conscious of the complex circuits of 
information exchange going on around them. However, throughout the 
last twenty five years a growing volume of studies, beginning with 
Westin's influential Privacy and Freedom, have sought to spell out and 
warn of the deleterious effects surveillance is having on the conduct of 
personal life. It is said that computerised surveillance threatens to 
penetrate and disclose aspects of private existence in a manner which 
undermines control over the information an individual wishes to 
communicate about himself to others. This, in turn, leads to all manner 
of distortions to the crucial aspects of human liberty which require 
protected zones of privacy for their maintenance and sustenance. 
Yet the pre-occupation with privacy conceals more than it reveals about 
the role of surveillance in modem societies. Even within the terms of 
the liberal discourse it is not clear just how surveillance invades 
privacy, or how it distorts individual freedom. More importantly, this 
discourse obscures the way in which the practices of surveillance are 
implicated in the subtle disciplining of individuals around pattems of 
behaviour which reinforce capitalist social power. This alternative 
interpretation means disentangling the concept of surveillance from the 
closely inter-related discourses of privacy and liberal social and political 
theory. Firstly, part one will examine how the construction of privacy 
as a series of spaces, each with a set of dependent functions central to 
individual freedom and autonomy, lends itself naturally to an assessment 
of surveillance based on the notions of intrusion and invasion. This 
construction serves to obscure altemative interpretations of surveillance 
as a mechanism of broad social control and precise individual discipline. 
This obscuring of surveillance is further enforced through the 
application of a larger liberal socio-political framework which 
disaggregates social structure into series of formalised relationships 
between private individuals, constituted as abstract entities replete with 
sets of universal rights and obligations, and a public realm which both 
limits and protects the individual in its provision of the social good. 
Part two reviews three groups of studies which have moved beyond the 
privacy thesis and assess surveillance as an integral element in the 
concrete application of social power. Rule and his colleagues have 
provided a comprehensive analysis of surveillance as a necessary 
element in the maintenance and extension of organisational power in 
social conditions dictated by a growing separation between the 
individual and the organisation. Organisational surveillance operates to 
identify and locate the anonymous mass of clients with which it deals in 
order to efficiently regulate client behaviour around the organisations 
rules. Despite important advances over the privacy theorists Rule's 
work is organised within a framework of organisational pluralism 
which repeats some of the limitations of the privacy thesis. 
Organisations are abstracted from any determinate socio-economic 
structure and surveillance practices are shaped by the overriding need 
of individual organisations to maximise control over their client 
environment. As a result, surveillance, as a method of social control, is 
rather oddly divorced from capitalism and no distinction is made 
between conmiercial and state organisations. 
In contrast, the recent studies of Oscar Gandy, Kevin Wilson, Webster 
and Robins, and Mark Poster specifically evaluate the role of 
surveillance in the accumulation strategies of corporate capitalism and 
are part of a growing number of radical studies, concentrating on the 
expanding practices of commercial surveillance in order to understand 
the vast system of social control developing in late capitalist societies. 
For Gandy new surveillance techniques embedded in the modem 
telecommunications infrastructure, such as consumer profiling and 
targeting, interactive videotex, and electronic funds transfer (EFTS), 
are part of a massive generation of information which functions as an 
important lubricant' for capital, helping to smooth the circulation of 
goods and services through production and consumption. A process, 
however, which further disempowers already marginalised social 
groups who lack access into the telecommunications infrastructure. 
Wilson, concentrating on the videotex phenomenon, explores how new 
cross-sector, corporate combinations of broadcasters, retailers, bankers, 
financiers, and telecommunications carriers are shaping the delivery of 
interactive information and entertainment services into the domestic 
home, a strategy which also provides instantaneous shopping facilities 
for viewers. The result is a real-time, on-line surveillance network 
which manipulates a vast amount of data on individual consumers in 
order to draw them into prescribed consumption patterns. 
Part two concludes with an assessment of recent attempts to incorporate 
Foucault's theory of disciplinary surveillance into critical analyses of 
contemporary capitalist electronic panoptical discipline. The work of 
Webster and Robins, and to a lesser extent that of Mark Poster, shows 
how powerful corporate combinations are mobilising a network of 
information technologies for the increasingly centralised discipline of 
individual movement around the changing needs of transnational capital. 
Finally, part three is an attempt to draw together the strands of 
disciplinary panoptical surveillance, through the particular example of 
EFTS, in order to show in some detail just how late capitalist discipline 
is beginning to operate. EFTS depends on an elaborate system of 
electronic surveillance, extending corporate control of the important 
material process of consumption in ways which simultaneously 
maximise consumer activity and direct it into increasingly purified sites 
of corporate-dominated shopping, while carefully disciplining the 
individual through the application of a battery of automated micro-
penalties for those who flout corporate rules. The complex patterning of 
behaviour administered through EFT may be the beginning of a larger 
disciplinary network, the understanding of which requires a definite 
break with the analytical constraints of both the privacy interpretation 
and that of pluralist organisational control. 
PART ONE: THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE - COMPUTERS, 
SURVEILLANCE AND PRIVACY 
(i) Westin on privacy: setting the parameters for surveillance 
studies 
Westin's Privacy and Freedom has become the benchmark of 
surveillance studies in the last two decades. Westin has not only 
influenced the content of mass surveillance studies since but also its 
explanatory framework, to the extent that there are very few studies 
that do not take up the aspect of individual privacy as the primary 
analytical focus. How then does Westin define privacy ? 
privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when and how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others. Viewed in 
terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, 
privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a 
person from the general society through physical or 
psychological means, either in a state of solitude or small 
group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condition 
of anonymity or reserve. The individual's desire for privacy 
is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally 
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged 
in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the 
desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and 
communication of himself to others, in light of the 
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society 
in which he lives. The individual does so in the face of 
pressures from the curiosity of others and from the processes 
of surveillance that every society sets in order to enforce its 
social norms 1 
There are two features of this definition which have resonated through 
surveillance studies ever since. Firstly, the structure of privacy is 
assessed through the metaphor of enclosed space whether it be physical 
or psychological. A metaphor which has a long heritage and is closely 
related to legal doctrines of individual sovereignty which constructs the 
self in the form of property and assigns definite rights of ownership and 
1 A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York, 1967), p.7 
control. Secondly, there is the notion of balance. The individual is 
suspended between the contradictory impulses of withdrawal and 
sociality. Westin maintains that the permanent 'struggle to achieve a 
balance between privacy and participation' operates across all cultures 
and all times, it is one of the 'core aspects of all social life'.^ 
Participation is assessed as dis-closure, a venturing out beyond the 
boundaries of privacy. It can be self actuated, in the voluntary exposure 
of the private self, or enforced through the curiosity of others and 
through the surveillance practices of the society's social and political 
authorities. Surveillance then is intrusion whether it be consented to by 
the individual, hidden from him, or imposed upon him.3 Much of what 
is termed here as the liberal perspective of surveillance is concerned 
with the dangers of upsetting this balance between the twin necessities of 
personal enclosure and and its enforced disclosure. 
Westin maintains that privacy is a cultural universal, evident to some 
extent in all cultures even though the level of tolerance for privacy in 
individual cultures differs markedly. Nevertheless, he sites four aspects 
of privacy particular to all cultures modem, primitive [sic] and even the 
animal kingdom. All cultures employ sets of 'distance-setting' 
procedures,^ 'rules of avoidance' to restrict the flow of information 
about themselves to others', necessary for 'protecting the individual in 
the stresses and strains of social interaction'.^ The means of distance 
setting vary and range from forms of physical covering - veils, and 
masks - to specially demarcated spaces with explicit rules of access, such 
as the various rooms of domestic dwellings. Most cultures, but not all, 
conceal genitalia, evacuation, sexual intercourse and often, moments of 
death and illness. Individual withdrawal into seclusion and isolation is 
also seen as a transcultural attribute of privacy. The need for 
contemplation, self-evaluation, spiritual communion and regeneration. 
Finally, small group privacy, essential for the creation of intimacy, is 
another virtually universal feature of human culture.^ 
p. 11 




However, Westin's primary focus is on the important function privacy 
performs for both the stability and dynamism of modem western 
democracies. He approaches this by integrating the core features of 
privacy - distance, seclusion, isolation, small group intimacy - into the 
functional requirements of democratic political systems. In modem 
societies it is the nature of the political system itself which is the 
'fundamental force shaping the balance of privacy, since certain patterns 
of privacy, disclosure and surveillance, are functional necessities for 
particular kinds of regime'.^ He maintains that one of the reasons why 
modem totalitarian regimes (fascism and conmiunism) ridicule privacy 
as 'immoral', 'antisocial', and part of the 'cult of individuality' is 
because the nurturing of independence, criticism and democratic 
participation is dependent on the depoliticised physical, psychological 
and group spaces which constitute individual privacy. Totalitarian 
systems maintain an extreme privacy imbalance through intensified 
surveillance in order to render transparent the hfe of the individual for 
the purposes of extinguishing the challenge privacy presents to the 
requirements of loyalty, obedience and uncritical acceptance of the 
regime. A life without privacy becomes one of fear, distmst, loneliness 
and isolation.8 
In contrast, modem democratic systems generally preserve large areas 
of social life, such as sport, art and literature, free from political 
participation, whether enforced or voluntary. The small group privacy 
of the family is important for the development of education, religion, 
and moral commitments. Clubs, societies, and pohtical parties provide 
important enclosures for independent discussion, criticism and 
resolution of community issues. The privacy of institutions such as the 
press, interest groups, and independent agencies are deemed essential 
for the enforcement of government responsibility.9 
While, for Westin, privacy is essential to the systemic requirements of 
modem democracy, too much privacy, insufficient disclosure, also 
presents dangers of its own. The provision of 'social good' - welfare 
services and law and order - depends on some level of personal 
disclosure for effective govemment planning, social research and law 
îbid., p.23 
îbid., pp.24-26 
enforcement. Excessive individual seclusion and isolation becomes 
socially dysfunctional, breeding apathy and indifference.lo 
Westin also claims that the privacy balance differs amongst democratic 
societies themselves. He contrasts the cultural conditions for the 
expression of privacy in US, Germany and Britain. Germany manifests 
an 'authoritarian democratic balance', a result of patterns ingrained in 
traditional family structure, conditions of secrecy in government, and 
high levels of respect for public authorities, all of which override the 
rights of criticism and non-conformity. The overall effect is a lower 
regard for individual privacy. In Britain a 'deferential democratic 
balance' operates which preserves a high level of individual privacy in 
both state administration and the realm of the individual. A 'tradition of 
tolerating non-conformism which treats much deviant political and 
social conduct as permissible private action' but also frees government 
and state authorities from rigourous public scrutiny. Not surprisingly, 
for Westin, the United States provides the most favourable balance. An 
'egalitarian democratic balance' prevails, upholding a creative tension 
between the nourishment of individuality and the lures and demands of 
participation: 
in which the privacy-supporting values of 
individualism,associational life, and civil liberty are imder 
constant pressure from privacy-denying tendencies toward 
social egalitarianism, personal activism, and political 
fundamentalismi^ 
In US history there has been a permanent dialectic between the credo of 
individual and associational privacy - essential for civil liberty, free 
expression and movement, dissent, pursuit of wealth, and high 
sociability through group interaction - and the 'privacy-denying 
tendencies' of equality, material progress, commitment to a 
psychologically open, materialist lifestyle which incorporates 'distrust 
and suspicion' of 'solitariness', 'unsociable types', and those dismissive 
of private gain. Conditions in which 'political fundamentalism' has 
^^ibid., p.25 
H i m , p.27 
p.26 
p.27 
thrived - xenophobia, isolationism, religious and racial prejudice, and a 
moral absolutism dependent on a 'censorial watching over the private 
lives of community members'. A balance which, in the post war era, 
has swung from the privacy-invasive, McCarthyite cold war suppression 
of internal criticism to the emergence of the civil rights movement in 
the 1960's.i4 
After examining the manner in which privacy is bound up with the 
functioning of western democracy, Westin retums to explore, in more 
detail, the mix of states and functions which constitute the core of 
individual privacy. He begins with the universal states of solitude, 
intimacy, anonymity and reserve. Solitude is the right of separation 
from others and from exterior observation. As we have seen, this 'most 
complete form of privacy' carries with it dangers for democratic 
systems. Intimacy is the selective 'seclusion' of small groups from 
outside prying and carries with it the intemal dissolution of the public 
and private r e a l m s . A n o n y m i t y is the right to freedom from 
'identification' in public space. The right to 'merge into the situational 
landscape' in conditions of relaxation and freedom free from the 
knowledge that systematic attention is being paid. Reserve is the 
preservation of psychological 'interior' space, 
These designated enclosures, classified along lines of interiority and 
exteriority, demarcating the public and private realms of the individual 
in society, provide the space for the set of intersecting functions of 
privacy. Personal autonomy is the 'preserving [of] the uniqueness of the 
individual by avoidance of being manipulated and dominated by 
oihtTs'Emotional release is the maintenance of space and time free 
from the exigencies of social norms, where societal expectations do not 
intrude. It is also an unburdening of the disappointment, anger and 
discontent generated through the necessities of public participation.18 
Self-evaluation is required for 'self-organisation', the 're-integration' of 
the myriad of public experience into pattems meaningful to individual 
identity; a function also essential to creativity and the formulation of 
^̂ ibid., pp.27-28 ^̂ ibid., p.31 ^^loc cit l'7zm,pp.33-34 ^̂ ibid., p.35 
self-expression. Limited and protected communication is the right of 
individual control over the disclosure of personal information, the 
application of discretion over what information is released. As such it is 
necessary for the building of trust and confidence. 
Westin assigns these spatial and functional enclosures to a series of 
concentric 'zones' in order to measure their specific weight in an 
overall equation between privacy and disclosure. The 'outer zone' is 
where the public and private dissolve in the unguarded disclosure of 
expression 'open to all'. Interior to this is the 'zone of intimacy' where 
selective disclosure is applied according to individual participation in 
specific groups such as families and close personal relationships. He also 
proposes a 'core self which is perfectly inviolate to intrusion - 'the 
hopes, fears, prayers, beyond s h a r i n g ' . ^ o 
In conclusion, Westin, then, seeks to build the anthropological basis of 
privacy into the functional necessities central to the reproduction of 
democratic liberal culture, according to an individual and cultural 
project replete with tensions and contradictions resulting from both the 
protection of private space and and its partial dissolution. Individuals 
are suspended in the psychological desire for, and the cultural 
expectation of, participation, and equally strong desires for withdrawal. 
Personal disclosure is both welcomed and enforced. Before examining 
the social forces behind the intensification of enforced disclosure, i.e. 
organised surveillance, in the early analyses of the surveillance 
theorists, it is worth examining how Westin's concentration on privacy 
set the agenda for proceeding analyses in the first wave of surveillance 
studies. 
(ii) Reinforcing the Privacy Interpretation 
Wamer and Stone's 1970 study The Data Bank Society follows Westin 
closely in linking surveillance to privacy, concentrating on the dilemma 
of participation and withdrawal, enclosure and disclosure: 
^^ibid., pp.36-38 
'^^ibid., p.33 
we are ambivalent beings possessing a gregarious instinct 
matched by the desire to retreat from the world...we need 
both to share and withhold...not only a desire but an absolute 
need for a core of privacy into which no one else is admitted^i 
However, whereas Westin sought to identify privacy in terms of 
anthropological universals, Warner and Stone stress the particular 
historical influences of western culture. While they traced the general 
notion of individual privacy back to the Judeo-Christian ethic of the 
'dignity of the person as a unique creation', they maintained that much 
of what is accepted as the right to privacy today is a result of the vast 
social and political upheavals of modernity. The process of 
industrialisation and rapid urbanisation dissolved the extended 
communal spaces constituting social life, producing the much more 
sharply defined private domestic space of the single family unit. The 
French revolution instituted the ideology of the rational individual with 
specific constitutionally-protected rights and freedoms. It is the 
coalescence of these diverse strands which give privacy its 
contemporary force.22 Yet, like Westin, they accept that privacy is a 
'fluctuating value' containing necessarily vague and unquantifiable 
'intangibles' which make the gauging of the legitimate scope of intrusion 
a difficult, but no less crucial, task.23 
Martin and Norman, addressing the national data bank issue in the late 
1960's, pose the dilemma between disclosure and privacy, restating 
Westin's concerns over the delicate relationship which constitutes the 
egalitarian democratic balance between private right and the provision 
of public good: 
the problem with 'privacy' is its conflict with other 
social values, particularly competent government, a free 
press, protection against crime, provision of services, 
collection of taxes, and the development of community 
living environments^^ 
21M Warner and M Stone, The Data Bank Society (Allen and Unwin, London, 1970), p. 124 
cit 
23 ibid., p. 126 
Martin and AR Norman, The Computerised Society (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), 
p.320 
Therefore the necessary invasion of privacy to secure these social 
benefits must be based on the assurances of anonymity and 
confidentiaUty guaranteed through individual consent. 
In the Assault on Privacy, Miller assesses the early evidence on the ways 
in which computers are challenging traditional modes of privacy 
invasion. His definition of privacy, once again, follows Westin. He 
points to the difficulty of classifying privacy, stressing its 
'exasperatingly vague' and 'evanescent quality' enveloping a number of 
basic rights and protections. He also recognises that the inability to pin 
point precisely where privacy starts and ends, because of its dependence 
on cultural context, must not obscure the fundamental right of 
individuals to control the information flowing from their personal life. 
Insufficient control leads to familiar privacy-denying problems such as 
interference into the right of personal seclusion and solitude.^^ 
Mowshowitz also recognises that privacy, as a moral right and a 
psychological requirement, is a socially contingent and fragile entity. He 
traces its philosophical heritage back to the 'social contract' school of 
eighteenth century liberalism in the work of Locke, Rousseau and Mill, 
uncovering principles and arguments which surface throughout the 
entire corpus of the privacy/surveillance debate. His study recalls the 
primary division between 'civil society' and the 'state of nature' and the 
creation of a social contract among men for the governance of society 
according to the norms of human reason. This entailed a series of 
commitments, obligations and renunciations on the behalf of the 
individual to the state as the sovereign 'collective interest' of liberal 
society. In retum, the state, guided by the deliberations of freely elected 
representatives, provides the 'public good', centred on the rights of 
liberty and property.26 This divide between the public sphere, defined 
after Rousseau, as the 'totality of particular, private interests', and 
individual right, is central to the liberal definition of privacy for it 
places basic expectations and hmitations on both parties. The individual 
as the site of liberty requires psychic and physical distance (privacy) 
under the proviso that he must subsume some of this right for the state's 
25 A.R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy (The New American Library Inc, New York, 1971), p. 188 
26A. Mowshowitz, The Conquest of Will (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1976), pp. 172-173 
administration of public good, a process which entails some 
surrendering of this distance. 
In many ways Mowshowitz' definition of privacy, in terms of person, 
property and information, represents the intersection of anthropological 
and classical liberal narratives of privacy. Westin's states and functions 
of privacy are supplemented by specific rights and protections accorded 
by liberal theory in the balance between individual liberty and the 
necessities of social enquiry. 
(iii) Privacy and Surveillance: Establishing the Connection 
From Westin onwards the vast majority of analyses of surveillance have 
been considered from the aspect of individual privacy. We have already 
seen that privacy has been constructed in terms of a spatialised 
enclosure, and that it is constantly compromised by the individual 
desire, and the social necessity of, disclosure. Westin defines 
surveillance as enforced disclosure. In modem societies this is secured 
in three ways - through observation, extraction, and by Ûit ^ ^ 
techniques of data surveillance. Each technique is staged for the 
enforcement of rules and norms particular to the surveilling agent, 
whether it be another individual, a state agency or commercial 
organisation, and each intrudes into particular spaces and functions of 
privacy. All three have spurned ever new privacy-depleting 
technological innovations. Yet, when properly regulated, they can also 
serve socially, and individually, positive ends.̂ '̂  
Surveillance through observation is an important method of securing 
individual compliance to institutional norms and regulations. Westin 
claims that the simple fact of awareness of being observed is a powerful 
corrective to potential non-compliance. Although a careful balance 
needs to be maintained between a level which reinforces behavioural 
expectations and that which intrudes destructively into personal privacy 
sapping individual loyalty and promoting hidden forms of deviant 
behaviour. In fact, Westin states that the extreme of near 'total physical 
surveillance' has traditionally been a defining feature of totalitarian 
social systems as well as Utopian social experiments. Because the 
27westin (1967) op cit, pp.57-58 
extinguishing of all boundaries to privacy is aimed at 'perfecting' 
behaviour by rendering it completely visible. Nevertheless, some level 
of visibility can operate as a protector of privacy, by improving the 
physical security of private individuals in public space or through the 
monitoring of individual welfare.^» 
The second technique of surveillance is extraction, defined by Westin as 
'entry into a person's psychological privacy by requiring him to reveal 
by speech or act those parts of his memory or personality that he 
regards as private'.^^ Extraction is related to forms of psychological 
testing which at the time was threatening to spread beyond traditional 
users such as police and welfare agencies into the wider counselling 
profession and beyond into the workplace for the testing of suitable 
employees. Westin believed these methods of extraction to be damaging 
to individual autonomy by enforcing a standardised and conformist 
intemal life, compliant to elitist professional expectations. A diminution 
of inner freedom and creativity in favour of a 'bland normality'.^^ 
Finally, Westin identified data surveillance as potentially the most 
dangerous of privacy invading techniques, and one that he spent the rest 
of his early writings analysing as developments in computerised record-
keeping and centralised data storage gathered momentum. Data 
surveillance was interpreted as an adjunct to existing manual and 
mechanical techniques of observation.^! The conflation of data and 
physical observation has since become a standard procedure in 
surveillance studies directing the analysis of surveillance along privacy 
lines. In assessing the scope and potential for data surveillance, Westin 
noted a number of social and technological trends and pointed to future 
prospects, some of which have proved uncannily accurate. In short, 
Westin's early analysis has continued to provide not only the 
methodological framework for the analysis of data surveillance (the 
invasion of privacy) but piá also the substantive content of future studies 
as well as the permissible range of solutions to its perceived dangers. 
^̂ ibid., p.59 
29/m., p.60 
(̂̂ ibid., p.61 
31zm,pp.l58-160 
Technological trends 
As Privacy and Freedom was written in the early days of the 
transformation from manual to computerised record-keeping techniques 
Westin's primary concerns were concemed with mounting fears of the, 
as yet unknown, potential of computers. Rapid advances in computing 
power and the advent of magnetic tape and disc storage techniques 
promised a future of accelerating data collection and greatly enhanced 
storage capacity. Fears were intensified as a result of proposals for 
massive centralised data banks for the pooling of information from a 
range of data gathering institutions. There was also some early evidence 
of increased routine sharing of data among government organisations 
and private sector institutions made easier by computerisation. In 
addition, there were some early indications that credit card transactional 
data was revealing details of individual movement, purchase patterns, 
and up to date knowledge of personal financial circumstances. 
Computerisation promised, and was already beginning to achieve, a 
profound transformation of the nature of personal documentation. Data 
was no longer restricted to the place of its generation and its shrinking 
physical form was making it more mobile which meant that increasingly 
mundane and routine details of personal life could be gathered, sorted, 
and exchanged between organisations, preserving inaccuracies, errors 
and all manner of information tom from the original context.32 
Social trends 
Westin identified two levels of social change behind the expansion of 
computerised record-keeping. The first level concemed the growth and 
extension of institutional power - the steady accumulation of 
govemment regulatory functions, the increasing bureaucratisation of the 
private sector, and the growing demand for aggregate data for the 
purposes of social planning and bureaucratic provision. Massive 
information gathering exercises such as census programmes, voter 
registration, law enforcement, and social welfare and taxation 
programmes were multiplying and extending in scope and were 
interpreted by Westin as the beginning of a trend toward the 
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institutional administration of social life.33 Moreover, a process which 
was being mirrored by private sector initiatives in health insurance, 
welfare programmes, and the expanding administration of credit. A 
related fear was that so-called statistical information generated in these 
programmes could be personally identified by tagging them with unique 
identification numbers thereby further enhancing the accumulation of 
personal data. The creation and centralisation of detailed personal files 
amassed by increasingly hidden, impersonal contacts with dispersed 
organisations, thereby documenting more and more aspects of private 
existence, threatened a progressive dehumanisation and 
depersonalisation of individual life, an undermining of personal 
responsibility, an extinguishing of the sources of autonomy, and an 
exposure of citizens to greater manipulation.̂ ^ 
Westin held that this extension in institutionalised data gathering was 
evidence of an adherence to a new information theory superseding an 
older approach which addressed the individual as a unique entity and 
based the collection of personal data on a restricted range of localised 
face-to-face interactions. Whereas new patterns of data gathering 
constructed individuals as physically absent, statistical identities and 
subjected them to a battery of predictive uses. A 'behavioural-predictive 
theory' 'which assumes the need for much more psychological and 
organisational data in order to make the decisions of social science, 
business and government. The more computers offer the opportunities 
to simulate behaviour, forecast trends, predict outcomes, the more 
pressure is generated for personal and organisational information to be 
collected and processed'.^s A process leading to the establishment of 
'mixed information' files containing selectively merged personal data 
with broader social and psychological classifications. Amassed details of 
personal life may be subsumed into psychological and sociological 
narratives. The resulting dissolution of existing distinctions between 
personal and statistical data carries with it dangerous privacy 
implications. Regardless of the problems of error and inaccuracy of the 
data contained within, these highly detailed 'record prisons' carry the 
status of permanent documentary evidence of individual lives, one that 
challenges looser and more hazy contents of memory and on-going self-
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estimation. The effect on privacy is a further loss of control over 
knowledge generated from the life activities of the self, damaging the 
privacy dependent functions of self-evaluation and the 'freedom to seek 
self-realisation in an open environment'. ^̂  
For Westin, the trends toward expanded institutional power and 
bureaucratised practices are symptomatic of larger transitions to a 
highly complex mass society in which the emerging institutional 
administration of social life is a product of incessant technological 
innovation, an increasingly affluent and mobile citizenry, and a 
transformation of social relations from face-to-face mediations between 
private individual citizens and localised public authorities to a more 
standardised data-based relationship between a depersonalised mass and 
large, distant bureaucracies.37 While he claimed surveillance has always 
been an important historical requirement for the protection of public 
safety, the rights of citizens, and the enforcement of social norms, new 
methods of surveillance were not merely the product of technological 
advance but part of some seismic shifts in the structure of western 
society which were disturbing the delicate balance between individual 
privacy and the requirements of social administration.38 
In studies since, most of the themes explored in Westin have re-
appeared as the nexus between surveillance and privacy has attained the 
status of unchallenged dogma. And, importantly, the issue of privacy 
has set the emotional tone of much of what was to follow. Ironically 
though, Westin's empirical follow up to the more theoretical Privacy 
and Freedom concluded with a measured denial of media hysteria about 
the dangers of computerisation. Databanks in a Free Society, which was 
commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences, contained 
individual profiles of computerising organisations in the public, 
commercial, and non-profit sectors and included a series of site visits to 
organisations in relatively advanced stages of computerisation. Westin 
and Baker found that computerised records had not increased in volume 
and scope when compared with manual systems and that the collection 
of 'sensitive' and 'subjective' personal data had not increased. In fact, 




remained largely manual in form. There was also no evidence that 
computerised systems were leading to increased data sharing among 
organisations nor of the merging and matching of organisationally 
discrete data. User access and client notification rights generally 
followed those established under manual systems.39 However, these 
conclusions have not gone unchallenged. Rule et al described Westin and 
Baker's study as 'deeply optimistic' and based too strictly on a single 
empirical method, that of employer response to survey q u e s t i o n s . ^ ^ One 
might also add that the computer technology of the time had not yet 
reached the 'take-off stage which would allow the real time networking 
of data among organisations nor the incredibly diverse points of 
automated data collection which were to follow. In addition storage 
techniques were still at this point relatively cumbersome and tied data 
down to the organisational location at which it was generated. 
Dunn and Wessel examined the problem of demarcation between 
personal and statistical data, a crucial issue in early 'data bank' debates. 
Supporters of centralised statistical data banks defended invasion of 
privacy accusations by arguing that statistical data for the purposes of 
research only would be included. Thus the privacy theorists needed to 
maintain a clear definition of each category and a meaningful distinction 
between the two. Dunn's classification, however, was relatively vague. 
Personal (or 'intelligence') data was defined as 'data about individuals as 
individuals', a case of 'finding out' about the individual. Whereas 
statistical data systems 'produce information that does not relate to the 
individual' but identifies characteristics that relate to 'groups' or 
'populations', generating 'aggregates', 'percentages' and 'describing 
relationships'. Statistical databases result from the observation of the 
'public face of the individual'.^! As we shall see (see p.34) neither 
definition helped to clearly classify the difference between personal and 
statistical data and where the boundary between them should lay. Yet in 
most studies the term 'personal data' is freely used and, furthermore, 
linked without examination to the reakn of privacy. 
39a.F. Westin and M.A. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society (Quadrangle, New York, 1972), pp.245-
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1980), p.130. 
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Wessel claimed that a greater danger lay in the assumption that only 
centralised personal data held privacy implications especially the 
problem of inaccuracy and error. He believed so called 'data-in-gross' 
had a number of effects which were not considered by the data bank 
proponents. Echoing Westin, he worried over the 'stigmatising' and 
'stereotyping' effect of statistical profiling in areas where it was 
becoming widespread such as law enforcement and in the calculation of 
insurance premiums. Data-in-gross was not protected by privacy torts 
yet it diminished individual autonomy and integrity, generalising people 
into social categories irrespective of individual circumstance.^^ In 
contrast to Dunn, Wessel thought all data on individuals was coloured 
by subjective interpretation and depended in what context and for what 
purposes it was used. ^̂  
Warner and Stone and Mowshowitz continued and extended the social 
complexity and individual mobility theme of Westin. Wamer and Stone 
feared that the freedoms of the 'permissive society' - mobility, choice, 
expression - was producing the contradictory phenomenon of tighter 
bureaucratic control: 
we are in a tight circle (which may well prove to be a spiral of 
encroaching legislation breeding a lack of restraint which, in 
turn, breeds demands for new legislation. The permissive 
society is in many ways paradoxically becoming a more 
restrictive society^ 
In the Conquest of Will, Mowshowitz argued that the expansion and 
centralisation of record-keeping in modem western societies is the 
result of a technocratic response to an industrial system which is 
fracturing under the pressure of social disorganisation - increased social 
mobility, specialisation of function in the work place, state 
administration, corporate organisation, and increasing community 
dependence on distant bureaucracies for the provision of individual 
security and welfare.45 He is critical of a technocratic ideology which 
defends the centralised administration of social and individual life as the 
42wessel op cit, p.38 
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only solution to fissures developing in the 'rambling edifice of modem 
s o c i e t y ' A c c o r d i n g to Mowshowitz, this is an ideology which not only 
reinforces the interests of the technocratic elite but also incorporates 
biologistic notions of species and eco-systemic complexity in order to 
naturalise the processes of social change. The natural 'evolution' of 
social complexity necessitates strengthened bureaucracies. An important 
aspect of social complexity overlooked in this ideology of 
administrators, planners and managers is that much of it is due to the 
modem extension of individual social choice in the freedom of mobility 
in occupation, residence, and lifestyle. And this is one of the main 
reasons behind the enormous generation of personal data.̂ '̂  However, 
the resulting conflict between the administration of social needs and the 
increasing mobility of citizens need not be solved by a deepening 
concentration of power. For Mowshowitz, there are altematives to this 
brand of social determinism such as a voluntary retreat back toward 
smaller scale organisational structures and the re-establishment of 
community responsibility and control. The only obstacle being the 
'absence of a coherent system of values' capable of challenging the 
technocratic dominance. 
(iv) Liberal Surveillance Studies After the 'first wave': 
Working With the 'invasion of privacy' Thesis. 
Computers and Bureaucratic Surveillance 
It is possible, accepting a certain overlap, to classify a second wave of 
surveillance/privacy studies dating from the late 1970's through to the 
early 1980's. Although these studies were still centred on the problem 
of privacy, they are less concerned with the initial 'shock' of 
computerisation and the potential effect on the fragile dialectic between 
private rights and organisational intmsion. The work of Wicklein, 
Bumham, and Campbell and Connor are, in Kling's terms, an 'expose' 
of the developing sophistication of computerised surveillance and the 
^^ibid., p.238 
^^ibid.. p.246 
patterns of bureaucratic manipulation of personal data.'̂ ^ xhe emotional 
tone is not one of future threat but actually existing dangers. 
Wicklein, in Electronic Nightmare, identified two levels of technical 
and bureaucratic convergence which were revolutionising the capacity 
of modem surveillance. Firstly, he thought the changing technical 
structure of surveillance was bringing together both the increased 
capacity of centralised computer storage and a emerging network of 
telecommunications links. The outcome is a deepening real-time 
interactivity between individual and corporate (conmiercial and state) 
cen t re .Second ly , this technical convergence was leading to the 
possibility of a 'single authority winning control of the whole system 
and its c o n t e n t s ' . I n his case study of the videotex phenomenon 
Wicklein showed how large corporations such as AT&T and Time Inc. 
were diversifying in order to control the delivery of information 
content (news, radio and television, entertainment, advertising) through 
the new fibre optic and satellite technologies as well as generating 
important data on individual viewing patterns. Wicklein claimed that 
corporate convergence threatened privacy in new and damaging ways. 
Detailed personal dossiers generated by corporate 'services' will not 
only be enhanced but rapid exchanges of electronic data between 
government agencies, credit reference centres, employers, broadcasters, 
and private investigators will further 'violate inner space', and reduce 
the protected spaces necessary for intimacy and autonomy.52 
Bumham, in The Rise of the Computer State, concentrates on the 
emergence of large, centralised bureaucratic databanks in both the 
private (AT&T, credit reference agencies) and the public sphere 
(Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, the FBI's 
National Crime Information Centre) and how personal information 
drawn from supposedly innocent sources, such as data on credit card use 
or personal phone logs can be used for directly political purposes such 
as tracking the movement of suspects, clients, political enemies.53 Like, 
49 R, Kling, The Struggles for Democracy in an Information Society', The Information Society, 
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Wicklein, Bumham is also concerned by the ease in which organisations 
like the FBI routinely cooperate with credit reporting organisations and 
private telecommunications carriers in the creation of a national 
network of surveillance. Bumham, like Westin, notes the danger of 
mixed databases containing 'statistical' and 'personal' information, such 
as the US Internal Revenue Service's 'Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program' which constructs a hierarchy of categories of 
taxpayers based on the level of compliance with taxation rules. Specific 
individuals who happen to fall into the lower statistical categories are 
then subject to a more exhaustive audit than others.̂ "^ 
Campbell and Connor's On the Record, is a detailed study of the 
development of massive state databanks in Britain and the complex 
architecture of routine information exchange between them. The study 
examined the inter-relations between such large data bases as the 
National Health Service Central Register, the Police National Computer, 
and the secret national security register known as the Joint Computer 
Bureau operated by MI5. These personal information gathering systems, 
by way of the national insurance numbering scheme, combine to 
provide a comprehensive record of all British citizens. Campbell and 
Connor generally proceed from a privacy perspective, stressing the 
importance of protecting informational privacy especially in regard to 
the creation of intelligence profiles on citizens by the police and social 
welfare agencies which contain a wide variety of personal data over and 
above that required for the administration of a particular government 
service. Such data gathered and exchanged by over-lapping and 
cooperating agencies is often riddled with inaccuracies, errors, outdated 
details, and data derived out of context from other bureaucratic 
sources.55 
Surprisingly, these accounts of massive computerised surveillance are 
anchored in a privacy analysis which reiterates common themes of 
forced personal disclosure, the destruction of intimacy, the chilling of 
individual right to free speech and expression, and the loss of control 
over personal information. 
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The Rise of Specialist Studies: Exploring the 'new surveillance' 
A trend in surveillance studies in recent years has been the examination 
of specific privacy effects in the wake of new innovations in 
information and communications technology in a wide range of social 
settings - the workplace, on the road, in the home, and the individual on 
the move between transactional locations. These studies relate to the 
changing technological structure of mass surveillance, characterised by 
Marx as the 'new surveillance': the automated, and largely hidden, 
tracking of individual movement, collapsing temporal and spatial 
distance between the individual and the operators of s u r v e i l l a n c e . ^ ^ 
Recent studies have also considered the re-appearance, in new 
technological guises, of older themes such as centralised storage of 
personal data and government attempts to institute universal 
identification schemes in order to better manage and manipulate such 
data. 
Marx's studies of new technology in the workplace show how invisible 
and automated monitoring of worker attendance and performance is 
restricting worker autonomy on the shopfloor and sapping the 
confidence of labour in management. In addition, the very invisibihty of 
electronic surveillance encourages a rigourous self-monitoring as the 
worker actively participates in his own surveillance. Martin in his study 
of the surveillance potential of automated vehicle identification and 
route guidance systems which locate, track and guide private 
automobiles in order to better manage growing traffic volumes 
concludes that these systems are an example of bureaucratically inspired 
technical fixes to deeper problems of societal over-reliance on the 
private automobile.Moreover, they provide ample opportunity for 
bureaucratic misuse in the unauthorised exchange of data on precise 
patterns of individual movement to interested third parties such as the 
police or state welfare agencies.^^ 
^^For a summary of the 'new surveillance' see G.T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America 
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A range of studies have also appeared addressing the privacy effects of 
new communications technologies. For example, the introduction of 
automated dialling services and calling line identification systems have 
been the subject of much telecommunications policy debate.59 Detractors 
point to new opportunities of advertisers and marketers to undermine 
the anonymity of individuals in their private home and how 
programmed re-dialling removes personal control over in-coming calls. 
It is already known that this unauthorised gathering of data is being used 
for direct marketing purposes. It is also believed that people may 
refrain from obtaining or providing sensitive information (eg. AIDS, 
pregnancy advise, volunteering police information) if line identifiers 
expose their identity 
Several international studies of the three waves of electronic banking -
EFTS, EFTPOS and 'smart cards' - have pointed to numerous privacy 
implications. Reports compiled by the Australian Science and 
Technology Council (ASTEC)^! and the OECD^^ raise concems about 
the documentation of previously anonymous cash transactions which 
leave a trail of individually-identified client movement. EFTS data 
provides real-time monitoring of individuals and can be exchanged to 
third parties for the tracking of criminals, suspects, welfare cheats. The 
reliance of EFTS on public telecommunications networks also makes it 
susceptible to unauthorised access through wire-tapping. EFT data can 
be channelled into the compilation of consumer records by financial 
institutions who can adjudge credit worthiness on finely detailed data of 
expenditure and borrowing pattems. Point-of-sale (POS) data can be 
manipulated by retailers for the intrusive targeting of new products to 
hitherto unidentified customers.63 Finally, the advent of so-called 'smart 
cards' which are essentially portable personal financial databases. 
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'Voice Networks and Databases', The Privacy Bulletin, Vol.7, No.2, May 1991; see also G.T. Marx, 
'Privacy and Technology', The World and /, September 1990, p.94. 
^ Davies op cit, pp. 15-16. 
^^ Australian Science and Technology Council, Towards a Cashless Society (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986), p.l l3 
62OECD, Electronic Funds Transfer: Plastic Cards and the Consumer (OECD, Paris, 1989). See also 
the brief early study by the Commission for the Future, Issues for a Cashless Society (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987), p.94 
63OECD op cit, pp.94-95. 
instantaneously updated at every transactional point, extend the scope 
for the unauthorised dissemination of private data.64 
The fear has also been revived regarding the centralisation of personal 
information. Linowes wams of the dangers of the largely unseen data 
gathering operations of the credit reporting industry which accumulates 
and exchanges enormous amounts of data from public and private 
sources in order to assess credit worthiness. He maintains that many of 
the largest databases of personal information are linked to the 
administration of personal finance. Such data impinges on privacy 
because it is generally gathered and exchanged without consent, at least 
a third of it is inaccurate, and a great deal of it is not essential to credit 
assessment.65 Furthermore, Linowes claims that the growing cost of 
credit assessment is leading to a change in the techniques of 
adjudication. In a confirmation of Westin's much earlier concerns, 
individually identified data is being replaced by clusters of statistical 
indicators which may bear no resemblance to individual circumstance 
but nevertheless decides admission to credit and determines personal 
floor limits. Linowes, echoing Westin and Wessel, believes such a 
practice 'diminishes individuality' because 'it is virtually impossible to 
identify exact reasons for credit refusal...the credit granting decision is 
totally dehumanised'.66 
(v) Translating the Privacy Interpretation into Legal 
Discourse: The Problem of Designating Data Ownership and 
Control 
As is to be expected, considering the close relationship traditionally 
existing between classical liberal and bourgeois legal theory, solutions to 
the problem of surveillance and privacy have been translated into data 
protection laws incorporating universal sets of fair information 
principles. The process of translation is centred on two aspects. Firstly, 
the reification of data generated through the growing volume of 
^For an international review of smart card developments and privacy implications see, J.A. Reese, 
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transactions between institutions and individuals is translated mio forms 
of property. This includes all transactional traces whether they be paper 
documentation or the electronic capture, and storage of, voice, data and 
image. Secondly, this mass of property is assigned ownership, 
incorporating specific rights of control over owned data. 
There have been many unresolved problems in the translation to legal 
discourse, some of which are intensifying as result of rapid 
technological change. Westin's study on constitutional protections 
against surveillance found that technological developments in physical 
surveillance could be effectively incorporated into existing concepts of 
trespass, intrusion and the rights of private ownership of property. 
However, he believed the development of systematic data surveillance to 
be dangerously free from any constitutional or legal regulation. This 
was because in a culture which promoted the free circulation of 
information no binding procedures had been developed to protect its 
'improper' collection, storage and transmission.^» Westin suggested 
constitutional changes such as the addition of a 'right not to 
communicate' clause in the first amendment and legal changes which 
would identify the right to ownership and control over personal 
information as a property right. He also argued for the adoption of 
procedural and substantive due process, guaranteeing rights of 
notification, access, examination and correction of data^^ and that 
bureaucratic decision-making based on such data should not be 
'arbitrary and capricious'.^o He proposed a set of administrative 
procedures to be operative at the organisational level which would 
properly regulate conditions of access and usage at the input, storage 
and output stages of the informational cycle. Rights and limitations on 
access could also be more carefully administered if they were based on 
on a clear categorisation of the status of accumulated data. He nominated 
three categories which closely approximated his 'zones of privacy': 
matters of public record would attract no access restrictions or 
limitations on usage; confidential information given in trust to certain 
individuals or agencies and which is subject to restrictions on use 
67A.F. Westin, 'Civil Liberties Issues in Public Databanks', in Westin (ed.), Information Technology 
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beyond the organisation itself; and security information which is that 
provided under the proviso of 'non-circulation' beyond the individual 
and agency directly involved^! 
Although some of Westin's proposals have been taken up in the 
application of 'fair information' procedures, further problems have 
arisen in the wake of innovations in information and communications 
technology. For example, many traces of interaction, transaction, and 
communication have become 'de-territorialised'^^ and can no longer be 
fixed to a geographical point and thus escape previously simple 
designations of ownership. This disintegration of clear patterns of 
ownership presents a serious challenge to both privacy theorists and 
policy makers who attempt to solve the problem of data surveillance 
through property-based laws of ownership and control. Data considered 
to be private but not under the control of the data subject (often because 
it has been generated without her knowledge) has been subject to an 
increasing variety of uses such as a host of 'secondary' uses by the data 
gathering institution as well as its sale to 'third parties'.'73 These 
problems have spumed some intemal criticism of the weaknesses of 
privacy legislation. 
In-house critics of the translation to legal discourse 
According to Rule the problem of ownership and control, dealt with in 
data protection legislation, has followed two paths. Firstly, there has 
been the establishment of 'procedural measures', pieces of legislation 
formulated in the wake of technological change which 'guide the flow of 
data once it has been collected, and the setting down of ground rules for 
what the parties to the data-keeping relationship may and may not do'.^^ 
These rules are generally based on the notion of fair information 
principles - which provide procedures of client notification of the kinds 
of data generated and the data source, which third parties have right of 
access to this data, the setting of definite limits to the purposes for 
which the data can be used and how long it can be held, and the right of 
71westin (1971) op cit, p.308 
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individual redress if data is inaccurate or misused.^^ In a recent study of 
the politics of data protection planning and implementation Regan found 
that the fate of fair information principles, whether they became 
operative and enforced in law, depended on how influential major data 
gathering bureaucracies were in protecting their domain of control 
from external regulators. In Regan's view much of the privacy and data 
protection legislation has become purely symbolic, pious legalisms 
offering no real control of bureaucratic practice.^é Laudon has pointed 
to an on-going tension in the US between the bureaucratic 
implementation of fair information principles and governmental 
pressures to reduce budget deficits (eg. the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984) through large scale information sharing across state bureaucratic 
boundaries. According to Laudon this is undermining the struggles of 
privacy advocates throughout the 1970's against the establishment of a 
national data centre. The demands of fiscal accountabihty in the 1980's 
has been the impetus behind the creation of 'de facto national data 
centres' which link personal file data from a range of participating 
government departments (Medicare, Intemal Revenue, Social Security) 
and, increasingly, private employers. This has resulted in the 
construction of an informal national information system, representing a 
definite 'retreat from privacy' in the 1980's.'77 
Rule believes that these procedural measures need to be bolstered by 
'substantive rules', clearly defining 'what forms of information can or 
cannot be collected in the first place, or what kinds of information do or 
do not have the right to exist'.'^^He sees the application of more 
rigourous substantive rules as the most effective method of combating 
the problems of ownership and control, especially in the control of the 
broader proliferation of information more generally. One strategy 
advocated by Rule is the creation of 'artificial barriers to such 
infringements in the form of policy measures to restrict or reshape 
information flow'. An example of this would be a clear and 
unambiguous commitment to the 'presumption of confidentiality' 
operating as a blanket acceptance 'that data provided for one purpose 
^^ibid., pp.14-16 
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will indeed be only used for that purpose and others compatible with it'. 
According to Rule this would help to restrict the increasingly routine 
re-use of information by the same data gathering organisation in other 
contexts of interest and its circulation beyond the organisation itself.^^ 
Although no advice is offered on how this may be implemented and 
enforced beyond the commonly accepted need for an independent 
privacy regulator 
However, for the critics of existing privacy legislation the estabUshment 
of legally enforced client control over the use and distribution of data 
must be supplemented by a binding commitment to a basic core of 
individual privacy, the identification and placement of a boundary 
inviolate to all kinds of intrusive surveillance that rapid technological 
change presents. Marx proposes a 'safety net or equity principle, such 
that a minimum threshold of privacy is available to all'.^^ Yet no 
further elaboration is forthcoming of where the threshold is to be 
placed or which categories of data should lay within the net deemed 
private. Rule is aware of the complexity of the problem, recognising 
'that there are no "natural limits" to areas of social life which might 
become subject to monitoring and that any specified zone of privacy is 
dependent on changing societal interpretation.^! Importantly, he is also 
aware that the designation of 'personal papers', a term he adopts from 
the influential American Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) 
report of the late 1970's and a long-standing legal term covering private 
data, rests on the dangerously inadequate defining principle, that of 
individual ownership linked to privately owned space. Rule as well as 
the PPSC consider this to be an insufficient safeguard for data now 
stored at numerous institutional locations and subject to rapid exchange. 
Rather than pursue the illusory goal of finding some universal ground 
of privacy or the formulation of theoretically endless rules of access and 
control to information generated and distributed without the consent or 
knowledge of data subjects, Rule resorts to traditional solutions, the 
establishment of legal ownership of personal data: 
private citizens...should have rights over the commercial use 
SÛMarx (1990) op cit, p.lOl. 
SlRule (1989) op ciu p.38 
of filed information about themselves akin to that enjoyed by 
celebrities over the commercial use of their public personae. 
Information in data files should not be sold or exchanged for 
value without permission of the individual; private individuals 
should be able to withhold, give away, or indeed sell rights to 
commercial use of their files^^ 
Marx proposes the principle of 'joint ownership' between both parties as 
a way regulating the dissemination of data, maintaining that any profit 
made in the sale of data must also be shared.83 Gray also calls for more 
clearly defined ownership of personal data, demanding corporate 
liability for misuse and inaccuracy.^^ A solution which is also taken up 
by Laudon who maintains that a 'price mechanism' attached to 
personally owned data would force large data gathering organisations to 
include the potential costs of surveillance within their overall budgeting 
targets and may operate as an economic inducement to its scaling 
d o w n . 8 5 
(vi) The Limitations of the Liberal Interpretation 
Surprisingly, the preceding liberal analyses of contemporary mass 
surveillance have not been subject to any sustained criticism. In fact, 
what has eventuated in the course of 25 years of surveillance studies has 
been the parallel construction of two explanatory frameworks emerging 
from different theoretical traditions and with few points of overlap or 
contestation. Theorists of the radical camp (see part two) have operated 
from a different perspective, attempting to relate the techniques of mass 
surveillance to the changing dynamics of capital accumulation and the 
manner in which these techniques are embedded in the continuing 
transformation and intensification of capitahst social domination. Rule's 
work remains the exception. In Rule privacy continues to be the 
measure of the social effects of surveillance while the requirements of 
organisational, but not explicitly capitahst, control are identified as its 
underlying cause. 
^'^ibid.. p.30 
83Marx (1990) op cit, pp.101-102 
Gray, 'Electronic Data Bases and Privacy: Policy for the 1990's', Science, Technology, and 
Human Values, Vol.14, No.3, Summer 1989, p.254 
S^Laudon (1986) op cit, pp.392-393. 
The absence of contestation between liberal and radical interpretations 
has had a number of effects. Firstly, the socially important goals of 
individual freedom and autonomy, shared by both camps, have been 
colonised by the liberal privacy interpretation. This has resulted in the 
widely accepted assumption that the maintenance of privacy, as 
constructed in liberal theory, is the sole method of protecting the 
universally accepted ideals of freedom and autonomy. Secondly, the 
concept of privacy is a central element in the abstract architecture of 
liberal social and political theory which formalises and equalises 
individuals as bearers of universal rights. It also carefully divides the 
private realm of the individual from a broader public realm and 
articulates a set of permissible interactions between the two. This 
process leads to the third effect of liberal theory, that of the removal of 
surveillance as a practice from the dynamics of capitalist social 
relations. Explanations of the rise of mass surveillance are linked to the 
expansion and bureaucratisation of an undifferentiated public realm 
which intrudes into the equally undifferentiated private world of the 
individual. Privacy then, is an ideological shell which has been dropped 
over the complex social and material processes which shape the 
conditions of the life of the individual and which serves to mystify the 
role mass surveillance plays in the manipulation and discipline of the 
individual in the direct and indirect (in the role of the state) interests of 
capital. Before examining the more radical expositions of this role we 
must first explore in more detail how privacy de-limits surveillance 
studies. 
From the perspectives outlined above, privacy is constructed as sets of 
spatialised enclosures surrounding and cutting across the individual 
body. From the work of Westin and his followers we can identify four 
fields of privacy. Territorial privacy is the space around the body and is 
associated essentially with the domestic scene of the private home. It is 
the site of the important functions of intimacy, seclusion, solitude and 
the free expression of sexuality. Physical privacy is bounded by the 
surface of the body and its clothing. A protective zone which encloses 
bodily function, the interiority of the body and its biological 
functioning, and bodily display. Psychological privacy is the protection 
of the internal space of the mind as the site of desires, imagination, 
fears, obsessions, and the formulation of ideas. Finally, the privacy of 
discourse is the right of individual control over inter-personal and 
individual-to-organisation communication. The right to 'limit and 
protect' the circulation of personal information. Westin also claims that 
the body in motion should be ascribed the rights of territorial and 
physical privacy for the protection of individual anonymity in the public 
sphere. 
Surveillance is interpreted as intrusion into these enclosures for the 
extraction of information regarding their contents. And is considered 
dangerous (although partially necessary) because the sources of 
individuality - liberty, autonomy, seclusion, anonymity, solitude, 
reserve, and self-evaluation - are nurtured within these boundaries. 
According to the political ideology of liberalism, surveillance also 
becomes dangerous if it effects an imbalance between the public and 
private spheres. Studies after Westin have shown how each zone has 
been affected. In the territorial zone, surveillance technologies can 
identify residential location, periods of home occupancy, occupant social 
structure, patterns of consumption, occupant financial status, income 
levels, types of welfare received, driving licence and registration 
details, and criminal histories. Physical privacy has succumbed to a 
battery of surveillance technologies of the body, which include 
biological and chemical identifiers, fingerprinting techniques, retinal 
and brain wave patterns, voice recognition technologies, identification 
of illegal substance use and medical details of body performance and 
intemal health. The privacy of the mind has been invaded by a range of 
psychological assessment devices including polygraphs, IQ testing, brain 
wave analysis and various therapeutic techniques. Privacy of discourse 
is undermined by miniaturised listening devices, telephone monitoring 
techniques and the confiscation of discourse data generated in individual 
to organisation contacts by the organisation itself.86 
Studies explored the effects of computerisation - the convergence of 
surveillance information into a single digital form; its increasing 
mobility, portability and ease of storage; the increasing de-
territorialisation of data as it migrates away from the zones of enclosure 
in which it is generated and is subject to increasingly unfettered 
86see Marx (1988) op cit, pp.208-216 for a fascinating catalogue of new technological developments. 
transmission and exchange between data dependent organisations. For 
privacy theorists the combined result has been a 'chilling' effect on 
personal behaviour, inhibiting free expression and compromising 
individual autonomy. 
A range of solutions have been advocated, and partially instituted, 
centred on the call for legally protected rights of personal ownership of 
data and the enforcement of the fair information principles of consent, 
access and the right of correction. 
Thus, for the privacy theorists, surveillance data is closely correlated 
with the structure of private life itself. It is a method of 'exteriorising 
the private self (Mowshowitz), providing a 'data image' of the interior 
scenes of private life (Marx), rendering a 'transparent world' (Miller). 
This widespread assumption has not been explored even though the 
attempt to distinguish personal from statistical data should have been a 
warning that there are difficulties in clearly defining where 'personal' 
data begins and ends. It is clear that privacy does not inhere in the 
content or structure of the pieces of data themselves. The crucial 
question is how certain pieces of data, or sets of related data, are given 
the role as windows into private life and in the process become 
embodiments of an invasion into privacy and, by inference, undermine 
the cherished functions of liberty or autonomy. The answer is that they 
are simply coded as private within privacy and legal discourse. For 
example, some data is given a high status privacy coding because it is 
believed to disclose attributes of what Westin would call the inner zones 
of the private self, the sites of intimacy, sexual expression, and 
disclosure of the body. Medium level coding might include the privacy 
of religious practice, personal medical history, political practices and 
beliefs, or the details of personal finance. Whereas an outer zone might 
consist of daily transactional tokens such as bus tickets, purchase 
receipts etc. In short, any classification of data is completely arbitrary 
as is the criteria for admittance. There is nothing inherently private 
about data related to an individual. This is a contentious claim but can 
be defended in two ways. Firstly, even if one accepts that data gathered 
on an individual invades his/her privacy in some respect depending on 
what zone of privacy it illuminates, it can still be argued that the great 
majority of data gathered on individuals represents only the outermost 
zones. For example, see figs. 1 and 2. Fig.l is a breakdown of 
government and state personal information categories compiled in 1970 
while Fig.2 represents a typical file in the notorious direct marketing 
industry. 
Figl : Typical categories of Information Stored in Databanks of Local and State 
Governments in the United States^^ 
1. Personal identity data 10. Civil action data 
2. Personal employment data 11. Probation / parole data 
3. Welfare data 12. Confinement data 
4. Health data 13. Registered personal property 
5. Tax data 14. Vehicle registration data 
6. Personal education data 15. Real estate data 
7. Voter registration data 16. Residence owner / occupant 
8. Licence and pennit data data 
9. Law enforcement data 17. Street section data 
There is nothing here which can be said to 'exteriorise' scenes or 
attributes from the zones of intimacy or seclusion, never mind the 'core 
self with its 'dreams, hopes, fears and prayers beyond sharing'. 
Fig 2: R.L. Polk & Co. Individual Household Data (1990)^^ 
1. Household income estimate 13. Mail responsive household 
2. Sex of head of household 14. Length of residence 
3. Type of dwelling unit 15. Possession of telephone / 
4. Month/ year of birth telephone number 
5. Marital status 16. Year / model / make of car 
6. Home owner 17. No. of cars owned 
7. No. of children under 18 18. No. of cars purchased new 
8. No. of persons employed since 1984 
9. No. of persons in household 19. Move data 
10. Occupation of head of household 20. Ethnic and religious coding 
11. Spouse's name 
12. Birth / high school / college data 
Nevertheless, it might still be argued that personal data such as medical 
details and criminal history will undermine the function of self-
evaluation and have a chilling effect on individual autonomy, especially 
in conditions of error, inaccuracies, and acontextual usage. 
87 Martin and Norman op cit, p.268. Of course, no single databank will contain data under all these 
categories. 
88David Shepard Associates Ine, The New Direct Marketing (Homewood, Illinois, 1990), appendix, 
p.415. 
Furthermore, one cannot deny that a small part of mass surveillance 
involves the gathering of unambiguous 'intelligence' data such as details 
of personal religious practices, sexual orientation and practice, political 
beliefs and affiliations. It must surely be admitted that these sort of 
intrusions push deep into the realm of personal privacy. But is this 
actually the case? Ironically, Campbell and Connor, in a brief aside 
amidst a general defence of privacy, point to an altemative reading of 
this claim. They argue that many oppositional sub-groups in modem 
society, for example, youth criminal offenders, wear their surveillance 
tags of criminal identity as badges of pride.89 In fact, a nimiber of social 
groups, traditionally targets of state and police surveillance, for 
example, gays and lesbians, ethnic minority groups, and political 
radicals, actively recast the pejorative labels attached to them, 
challenging attempts to marginalise and silence them. The same is true 
of those medically categorised as AIDS victims or the physically and 
mentally disabled. Rather than isolated individuals defending some 
abstract right of privacy through legal means in order to re-establish 
personal autonomy 'chilled' by state surveillance practices, this 
collective resistance is aimed at altering the balance of social power in 
order to extend their autonomy and freedom. Protecting privacy, as 
constructed by the privacy theorists, is largely irrelevant in this 
struggle. 
This suggests that the purposes of surveillance are more closely related 
to the management of individuals, the effectiveness of which rehes on 
the position of both surveillance operators and victims in the overall 
structure of socio-economic and political power. As we wiU see below 
ownership and control of the means of information and communication 
is becoming crucial in this struggle. 
Secondly, the rise of statistical data surveillance further impairs the 
privacy analysis and confirms a broader social control interpretation. 
Westin initially raised the issue of how clever mixes of personal 
psychological data and broader statistical data could form predictive 
models of how certain classes of people could be expected to behave in 
certain sets of circumstances of interest to organisations. Such data 
could then be used to screen out undesirable individuals from 
^̂ Campbell and Connor op cit, p.21 
participation in a particular organisation's services. This theme has been 
a recurring feature of studies of surveillance. Linowes addressing the 
practices of credit surveillance, maintains that an ever greater 
proportion of purely statistical data is now being used for the assessment 
of individual credit worthiness based on categories of age, occupation, 
and demographic criteria. Dunn notes the growing range of state-based 
statistical surveillance, such as census details and crime information 
statistics. A feature also of increasing importance to the practices of 
marketing surveillance which utilise complex forms of statistically based 
demographic and psychographic data. This further weakens the 
argument that mass surveillance is a form of personal intrusion. Even it 
is accepted that there is a meaningful distinction between private and 
statistical data, a division which is poorly defined and is not supported 
by evidence of the nature of 'private' data gathered by organisations, the 
emergence of purely statistical surveillance can not be related to 
personal intrusion in any direct way. Personal privacy does not play any 
role in this form of surveillance and it must be assessed on grounds 
other than that of intrusion or invasion. 
Nevertheless, statistical mass surveillance has generally been colonised 
by the privacy debate. Its effects are measured by the privacy theorists 
as distortions of individuality and in terms of constraints on personal 
freedom and autonomy. Westin and Wessel feared the chilling effect on 
individual behaviour and the stereotyping of individuals according to 
categories which may be inaccurate when related to specific individuals 
which not only affects access to state and commercial services but may 
render them susceptible to dangerous criminal categorisations. Marx 
notes the shift in poHce surveillance 'from targeting a specific suspect to 
a categorical suspicion of everyone' and how this induces 'self-
monitoring' of behaviour.90 However, he refrains from exploration of 
the social dynamics of this form of surveillance-based control and 
restates familiar privacy concerns of liberty and rights of the individual. 
Thirdly, it is clear from the above that there are a number of 
unexamined epistemological problems involved in the very principle 
that so-called 'personal data' is either a transparent representation of the 
scenes and attributes of the private realm or, more problematically, is 
90Marx (1988) op ciu p.219 
equated with the private realm itself. The ambiguity and slippages 
between sign and referent are now widely accepted and arguments for 
transparency need to show more clearly how such documentational 
representations connect with the spaces of privacy. The documentational 
artefacts which are said to illuminate the private realm are merely 
'traces' left from the interface between surveillance operator and data 
subject.91 In addition, the decision about what constitutes the content of 
these traces is always taken by the operators of surveillance themselves, 
and are linked to various organisational needs. Whether or not a trace 
contravenes privacy is immaterial to surveillance operators. We shall 
see later that these traces are crucial for the purposes of individual 
discipline and represent an important method of deepening social 
control in capitalist societies. 
However, considering the difficulties of equating surveillance with the 
invasion of privacy, it must be said that nowhere in the privacy 
literature is it maintained that the sole purpose of data surveillance is to 
invade privacy. Yet, the interpretation of its effects are limited to 
precisely this. The result is a narrowing of interpretation based on the 
fiction of intrusion and a suppression of the social control aspects of 
surveillance. This is in spite of Westin's own, unexplored, declaration 
that 'surveillance is obviously a fundamental means of social 
control...without such surveillance, society could not enforce its norms 
or protect its citizens'.^^ Once again, however, this theme is scarcely 
examined. 
Of course, privacy theorists may argue that it is not so much the space 
itself which is important but the maintenance and nourishment of 
individuality that privacy affords and that the universal social goals of 
freedom, autonomy, and self-expression are undermined by excessive 
surveillance. This is undeniably true, but another important aspect of 
91 The concept of 'trace' is similar to that used by Latour in his studies of textual inscriptions 
generated in scientific laboratory practice. The bars, graphs, lines, and dots, said to constitute 
experimental evidence and which purport to represent an objective reality below the text, actually 
operate as pseudo referents which merely reinforce the assumption that text corresponds with reality. 
The association between documentation and an underlying private realm is based on a similar process 
except that in this case the private realm is not something discovered, and then represented in the text, 
it is already assumed. Documentational traces which constitute 'personal information', nevertheless, are 
believed to operate as transparent markers of the private realm. See Latour's discussions of traces and 
inscriptions in B. Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the Worid', in K. Knorr Cetina and 
M. Mulkay (eds.). Science Observed (Sage, London, 1982), p. 161 
92westin (1967) op cit, p.67 
the privacy interpretation is a refusal to address the manner in which 
the concrete expression of these ideals is socially contingent, linked as 
they are to the uneven application of social power in specific socio-
economic contexts. In fact, the satisfaction of these goals is not 
dependent on the surrounding privacy shell as constructed by the 
privacy theorists. However, the socio-political narrative of 
constitutional liberalism which shapes the privacy interpretation closely 
articulates and inter-relates the concepts of privacy and freedom in ways 
which bracket out their social contingency. It also shapes and limits 
answers to the broader questions of why surveillance is intensifying, 
expanding and becoming more technologically sophisticated. 
Westin's initial commitment to a civil liberties interpretation of 
contemporary surveillance was a formative moment for proceeding 
studies. Nearly all the privacy studies have adopted a framework of 
classical liberalism which has resulted in the application of a range of 
purely formal concepts intruding unexamined into empirical surveys of 
surveillance. This has meant that studies of modem surveillance have 
been structured within a conceptual framework of eighteenth century 
liberalism derived from the historical experience of early 
entrepreneurial capitalism. The inadequacy of this approach in 
contemporary conditions of highly bureaucratised, transnational capital 
has surprisingly gone unnoticed. 
There are two basic principles of classical liberalism which are upheld 
by the privacy theorists which might be termed the formalisation of the 
individual and the formal symmetry^'^ of social power. These two 
categories provide the ideological content of the privacy analysis of 
surveillance. In addition a third principle, which has been called 'the 
crisis of liberalism', establishes the grounds on which the rise and 
menace of surveillance is interpreted. 
The Formalisation of the Individual 
A universal feature of privacy narratives is the construction of the 
individual as a generic category. One that assigns an equal complement 
93The term belongs to Goldstene. See P.N. Goldstene, The Collapse of the Liberal Empire (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1977), p. 15. 
of natural rights (liberty, privacy, property, estate) to all irrespective of 
class, education, race, gender. A process of de-contextualisation which 
submerges not only the particularity of the individual but abstracts 
him/her from any determinate social context. This common feature of 
liberal theory has a number of effects on the social analysis of 
surveillance. Firstly, surveillance is equalised in its effects, a linear 
process of intrusion into a shell of privacy in which the rights of the 
individual are lodged. Secondly, individuals as abstract bundles of rights 
are transferable to any point on the social fabric. As recipients of 
surveillance whether in the workplace, in the operation of the welfare 
system, through their business and financial transactions or their 
political activities, the effects of surveillance are the same. There are a 
number of clear examples of this in the privacy literature. Marx, in his 
study of new surveillance technology in the workplace, proceeds from a 
purely privacy interpretation.^^ In doing so he disengages surveillance 
from its central role in the maintenance of the structure of social power 
operating at the level of production. It is used to intensify the authority 
of capital over labour through the perpetual increase in the productivity 
of labour secured through a mix of labour-displacing technologies and 
an increasingly disciplined and compliant workforce. The privacy of 
workers had long been compromised before the establishment of 
electronic surveillance. The individual in production is not a citizen 
with all the attendant rights of liberal theory - privacy, autonomy, 
liberty, dignity - suddenly compromised by new technological practices, 
but a recipient of historically changing expressions of social power 
dictated by the requirements of capitalist industrial competition. 
Electronic surveillance is simply the latest strategy in a history of social 
exploitation.95 Similarly, Westin, Miller and Linowes' references to new 
surveillance practices at the level of consumption whether it be credit 
determination, EFTS, or direct marketing, are shaped by privacy 
concems.96 No consideration is given to their role in the stimulation and 
discipline of consumption driven by systemic needs of product 
expansion and diversification.97 Martin's analysis of surveillance on the 
94see p.24 above. 
95This disciplinary dimension is also overlooked by Rule in his concern over new threats to privacy in 
the workplace, even though he accepts that surveillance is being utilised to monitor and improve 
worker performance. Rule (1989) op cit, pp.21-22. 
96 Westin (1967) op ciu pp.162-165; Miller (1971) op cit, p.84-87; Linowes, see above p.24. 
97 Westin has recently published a checklist of measures which companies can take to improve 
consumer privacy, based on traditional fair information principles. Although he is concerned at the rise 
road also misses a number of specific aspects of social control through 
its concentration on the invasion of privacy. For example, one might 
examine how vehicle identification and route guidance systems are 
linked directly to the economic power of transnational automobile 
producers and indirectly to the wider systemic needs of capital 
accumulation. They are forms of surveillance which secure a number of 
definite benefits for capital. K, as Martin suggests, they are linked to a 
user-pays system of road use, they help to remove those unable to pay 
and may progressively hand prime-time road use over to traffic 
essential to the circulation of capital such as labour, conmiodities and 
consumers. A process which speeds up the circulation of capital by 
reducing un-economic road use while at the same time providing a 
private-vehicle solution to traffic congestion.^s Finally, in Campbell and 
Connor's study of intensifying bureaucratic surveillance operated by the 
British state in the 1980's abstract privacy concems predominate and no 
connection is made between surveillance and the crisis conditions of 
British capitalism and the establishment of oppressive forms of social 
policing taking place at many points in British s o c i e t y 
The overall effect of this formalising and de-contextualising of the 
individual is an ignorance of the uneven distribution of surveillance 
across society. It leaves many questions unanswered. Why do people 
gathered at certain locations or involved in certain activities (in the 
factory, as welfare recipients, or targeted consumers) attract a greater 
density of surveillance than elsewhere? Are certain groups of 'citizens' 
clustered around these high density surveillance locations? If so, what 
are the implications? What are the links between surveillance and the 
configurations of social power in the decisive sectors of capitalism -
production, consumption, social reproduction, state administration? 
of consumer surveillance there is no attempt to discern why it is expanding nor any analysis of its 
intended social effect beyond its supposed link to the extension of customer choice. A.F. Westin, 
'Managing Consumer Privacy Issues - a Checklist', Transnational Data and Communications Report, 
July/August, 1991,pp.34-35. 
9^Scott, in a study of the same technologies, does mention various social control aspects. She notes 
the deepening managerial control over transport fleet performance made possible by the transference of 
traditional driver skills (the monitoring of driver and engine performance, traffic conditions, stops made, 
and route taken) to in-built technological control systems. Although some mention is made of the 
benefits to capital in this process - notably the increase in relative surplus value - the issue is not taken 
up in any detail. P. Scott,'Road Transport Informatics: Challenging tiie Freedom of the Roads?', 
Prometheus, Vol.9, No.2, 1991, pp.308-309 
99A theme taken up in the work of Stuart Hall. See, for example, S. Hall, Thatcherism - A New 
Stage?', Marxism Today, February, 1980. pp.26-27 
Such questions are never considered because capitalism, as an actually 
existing socio-economic system, is entirely absent. The removal of such 
questions by ideological decree once again reinforces the privacy effect 
of surveillance and minimises the aspect of social control. Thirdly, these 
procedures of formalisation limit the range of solutions to the problem 
of surveillance to only one, the extension of legally enshrined forms of 
protection. 
I 
The Formal Symmetry of Social Power 
As Goldstene has pointed out, the formal architecture of liberal theory 
is designed to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of single 
individuals. In each social realm - the economic and the political - a 
pluralisation of power is maintained. A series of constitutionally 
designated checks and balances which reconcile the passion for conquest 
and distinction inscribed in all men. In the economic sphere 
concentrations of power are avoided by the rule of the free market in 
which the the laws of competition produce an equalising effect. Sealed 
of from the economic sphere is the realm of politics, which reconciles 
the mass of conflicting private interests for the maintenance of overall 
stability. The political sphere is characterised by a careful 
compartmentalisation of authority between legislature, executive and 
judiciary which mitigates against the concentration of state power. lOO in 
fact, the state is viewed as a necessary evil but when left unconstrained 
becomes a dangerous threat to the rights of the individual. A more 
general bifurcation cuts across these realms, that between the public and 
the private. The public sphere is not only portrayed as a disinterested 
reconciler of private conflict but the provider of the conditions for 
individual freedom/rights. While the private sphere itself is 
depoliticised, sealed from the arena of formal political practice. This 
means that the so-called reahn of the individual, with its formal rights 
and duties, is often extended into the economic sphere (the private right 
of property, the right of contract between economic agents) resulting in 
the minimisation of other important relations of social power, 
particularly, as we have seen, that of the struggle between labour and 
capital. The overall effect is the simplification of social structure into a 
lOOcoldstene op cit, pp.11-15 
basic dichotomy between the individual, constructed in terms of 
constitutional rights, and the demands of a public sphere. This general 
public/private bifurcation results, in the privacy literature, to an 
undifferentiated co-mingling of state and conmiercial organisations, 
maintaining various levels of surveillance which invade to some 
measurable extent individual privacy. All the early studies contain 
examples from across this divide. It never occurs to privacy theorists 
that surveillance mounted from within the state, the commercial sector, 
or production might serve different purposes and be adapted to 
different organisational ends. 
In addition, in this construction of formalised abstract individuals, 
located in a carefuUy balanced symmetry of social power the important 
concepts of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' are also decontextualised and thus 
rendered purely formal and abstract. As in the case of privacy, each 
individual is presumed to have access to a standardised quota of freedom 
and autonomy and challenges to this quota through excessive 
surveillance is presumably something which afflicts each individual in 
the same way. Once again, it does not seem to occur to the privacy 
theorists that the expression of freedom and autonomy is dependent on 
an array of social factors such as class location, level of political 
influence, and access to education and sources of information which are 
crucial for individual empowerment. 
Finally, in the privacy literature the shifting balance between the rights 
of the individual and the expansion of bureaucratic surveillance is 
played out within a broader narrative which is commonly referred to as 
the 'crisis of liberalism'. This is centred on the identification of a 
number of social and technological processes, which in combination are 
massifying and standardising modem society, replacing the unique 
individual with a kind of featureless social atom.ioi Typical explanations 
for this are the problem of uncontrolled technological change and the 
lOlpor an overview of the 'crisis of liberalism' thesis see, T.V. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd 
Edition (WW Norton and Co, New York, 1979), pp.22-35; and Goldstene, op cit, pp.42-54. Lowi 
maintains classical liberal theory has been undermined by the modem transition to state and corporate 
administration which has supplanted individual, automatic, self-control by conscious, organised, 
economic and social planning. Goldstene in a similar fashion blames the 'emergence of organised and 
co-ordinated knowledge', in which planning 'replaces the spontaneity of the market'; a new social order 
in which the 'power of the order is secreted within a plurality of technostructures, pluralised in 
themselves, beyond identity and beyond the balance of liberal control'. A process driven by de-
individualised, organisational men, of 'specialist competence', and displaying a corporate loyalty. 
rise of enormous bureaucratic structures in order to deal with the 
gathering 'complexity' of social life. Because liberal theory is 
predicated on the denial of social theory beyond a commitment to a 
pristine early capitalist entrepreneurialism, of free individuals in an 
unfettered marketplace, the centralisation and corporatisation of capital, 
the organisation of labour and the expansion of the state are threatening 
developments that must be explained in ways that do not challenge the 
dominant theory. To suit this end technological change is seen as a 
natural process which impinges, unexplained, from without, rather than 
as a crucial tool for expansion and intensification of the social power of 
c a p i t a l . 102 Likewise the movement to conditions of 'social complexity' is 
left unspecified, free of any particular sources of determination. 
Mowshowitz' work is a prime example of this. Although he explicitly 
warns of the dangers of using deterministic models of the rise to 
complexity, such as biological and mathematical s y s t e m s , h e can offer 
no alternative explanation of why individual mobility is increasing or 
the why the social division of labour is deepening. Moreover, his call 
for a voluntaristic return from complexity to a more simplified social 
scale merely deflects a proper social explanation. Miller maintains that 
modem society is undergoing a 'cybernetic revolution': in which 
'technological improvements in information-handling capability have 
been followed by a tendency to engage in more extensive manipulation 
and analysis of recorded data. This in turn has motivated the collection 
of data pertaining to a larger number of v a r i a b l e s ' . H o w e v e r , it 
seems that this feedback loop is determined by nothing other than 
natural technical change itself. 
The liberal perspective of surveillance is based on a series of linkages 
which connect the individual ownership of privacy with the right to, and 
the possibility of, freedom. A freedom which can only be realised in a 
particular architecture of political and social power, that of 
constitututional liberalism and laissez faire capitalism. Yet there have 
lO^Bennett has noted the tendency toward a technologically determinist explanation of the expansion of 
surveillance evident in the work of the privacy theorists. An explanation 'based on the assumption that 
a technological imperative is at work and that public policy can only mitigate its worst effects'. 
However, he does not explore any alternative explanations. C.J. Bennett,'Computers, Personal Data, 
and Theories of Technology: Comparative Approaches to Privacy Protection in the 1990's', Science, 
Technology, and Human Values, Vol.16, No.l, 1991, p.58 
lOSj^owshowitz, op cit, p.228 
lO^Miller op ciu p.35. 
been attempts to develop alternative modes of analysis of surveillance 
which are not trapped in this framework. Parts two and three will take 
up and critically review some of these approaches. 
PART TWO: TOWARD A CRITICAL SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
OF SURVEILLANCE 
(i) From the Individual to the Organisation - Surveillance as 
the Core of Organisational Control 
The Work of Rule and his Colleagues 
The work of James Rule and his colleagues over the past two decades 
represents an adjunct to the privacy-based analyses of the study of 
surveillance in favour of a more rigourous attempt at providing a 
comprehensive sociology of s u r v e i l l a n c e . However, there are 
similarities. Rule's work in some ways stands adjacent to the privacy 
theories, substituting organisations for individuals as the primary unit of 
analysis and in the construction of a framework of organisational, 
rather than individual, pluralism. 
Rule's critique of Westin and the early surveillance studies is centred on 
the belief that Westin's idea of privacy is often markedly different than 
that commonly used in discourses of daily life. We have seen that 
Westin's conceptualisation of privacy, composed of specific zones and 
associated states and functions, is generally territorialised and fetishised 
into a form of property. We have interpreted this as a central 
component of the abstract, universal rights of classical liberalism, the 
political ideology which guides all of his work including the attempt to 
incorporate the rise of informational privacy. The coding of certain 
forms of communication and documentation as private is important to 
Westin because it allows them to be assessed in terms of specific rights 
of ownership and control. Rule is critical of this framework because it 
locks Westin into purely regulatory and legalistic solutions to the 
problem of expanding surveillance. For Westin the defence of privacy 
can only be maintained through the ascription to the individual of 
definite rights of ownership and control. According to Rule, he is then 
105J,B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (Allen and Lane, London, 1973); J. Rule, D. 
M c A t o , L. Steams and D. Uglow, The Politics of Privacy (Elsevier, New York, 1980); J. Rule, D. 
McAdam, L. Steams, D. Uglow, Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society', 
in LJ. Hoffman ed. computers and Privacy in the Next Decade (Academic Press Inc. New York, 1980); 
J.B. Rule, D. McAdam, L. Steams and D. Uglow, 'Documentary Identification and Mass Surveillance 
in the United States', Social Problems, Vol.31, No.2, December, 1983. 
[this] makes it plausible to contend that privacy is protected 
in personal-data systems if only people are accorded some 
say in the treatment of their i n f o r m a t i o n i ^ ^ 
Conceding that there is 'no natural limit to surveillance', Rule believes 
this plainly contradicts both the public interpretation of privacy and the 
manner in which its effects are dealt with. 
Throughout his work Rule contends that the explosion of data 
surveillance is endemic to the bureaucratic-organisational dynamics of 
contemporary society and at some point an 'aesthetic reaction' to the 
deepening intrusions into privacy and autonomy must take precedence 
over the permanent procedural guarantees of protection. This implies 
that attempts must be made to limit surveillance rather than merely 
regulate it.̂ ^^ The proliferation of data surveillance must be challenged 
at the level of bureaucratic structure and practice. Privacy theorists, 
unable or unwilling to attend to the broader sociological dimension, and 
entrenched in legalistic and procedural forms of individual protection, 
only succeed in 'domesticating' the privacy issue 
most discussion among policy-makers and scholars is in the 
elimination of particular sets of abusive practices....making 
surveillance systems work better, on the assumption that both 
organisations and individuals ...shared an interest in achieving 
the ends for which the systems were created - shut[ting] out 
the examination of the larger desirabihty of the growing power 
of surveillance systems in g e n e r a l . 
Rule's own analysis is set against a landscape of interacting, cooperating 
and competing organisations which have elaborated complex modes of 
control over their individual clientele. The analysis proceeds from two 
separate perspectives which when taken in combination form an 
overarching global conception of the nature of modern mass 
surveillance societies. 
The level of the individual organisation 
lO^Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy, op cit, p.82. 
ibid., p.79 
lO^Ruie et al Preserving Individual Autonomy...', op cit, p.73. 
An important feature of organisational pluralism, amply demonstrated 
by Rule's work, is the reduction of diverse social groups to a single, 
generic classification and an accompanying universalisation of their 
practices. In this way Rule clusters together 'families, sects, states, 
business interests, religious sects'i^^^ and he may just as well include 
trade unions, political parties and schools. Against this an equally 
similar and undifferentiated clientele. All organisations act to extend 
control, by 'reaching out' to their 'client periphery', 'developing 
systems for coping with uncertainty in their environments', via a battery 
of surveillance-based practices. ̂ ^̂  
Documentational surveillance is central to the identification and location 
of clients, the first step of the control process. In their study of six 
documentational systems in the US, Rule and his colleagues found that 
'tokens of self-identification' - principally passports and birth 
certificates - were the primary means by which organisations secure 
identity of individual clientele, they are also the generating source of 
other personal documents. High integrity identification and on-going 
locator mechanisms provide the basis on which organisational 'powers 
of control' can be extended, m 
Organisations 'secure the compliance' of clients through the application 
of rule-based procedures and regulations which 'enforce' the behaviour 
required of them. The administration of consent cannot simply rely on 
the goodwill of clients in following standard procedures. Rule's early 
study of five large bureaucratic systems showed that they 'staged' their 
surveillance operations around the enforcement of client control based 
on a continuum of control measures ranging from sanction to exclusion. 
Mechanisms of sanction might be purely symboUc, such as wamings, 
reprimands or punishment in the form of fines and charges. Exclusion 
may be partial in the suspension of services or total in the expulsion of 
the client from the system.The systematic application of sanction and 
exclusion serve as extra sources of data surveillance, mediating 
continuing and future chent relations with the o r g a n i s a t i o n . 112 
109Rule (1973) op cit, p.20 
llORule et al "Preserving Individual Autonomy...', op cit, p.67. 
l l l R u l e (1983) op cit, p.222 
l l^Rule (1973) op cit, p.22 
Rule draws an important distinction between bejwéen the application of 
the techniques of physical surveillance suitable in small scale, local 
communities and the massive documentary systems necessary for 
securing compliance from a 'mobile, anonymous public'. He advances 
five conditions which make documentary surveillance the only effective 
means of social control: when the client base of an organisation has 
'become too large and anonymous for face-to-face acquaintance'; for the 
enforcement of organisational rules; when the application of rules 
requires complex decision-making regarding client entitlements; when 
the application of rules require highly discriminating decision-making 
from a mass of detailed personal information; and the linking of each 
client with the documentation arising from his/her past behaviour. 
The maintenance of client consent, the provision of services, the 
minimisation of deviant behaviour and the overall administration of 
'normalised' system of relations between the organisation and client 
leads to a simultaneous intensification of decision-making power and 
documentary monitoring as past deeds must be linked with current 
status and behaviour, and both enter into future decisions. 
Organisational powers of control cannot extend and multiply without 
limit and it can be inferred from Rule that individual organisations must 
operate within an overall economy of surveillance. Rule sees a 
continuing dialectic between the need to permanently extend and 
intensify surveillance against an opposing constraint of containing 
operating costs. The 'surveillance capacity' of an organisation is 
improved by multiplying the 'points of contact' between it and the client 
within its defined operational 'jurisdiction'. The density and range of 
surveillance is shaped by the organisations expectations of the client in 
accordance with the type of service offered and the rules and 
regulations which need to be maintained. Improving surveillance 
capacity increases the visibility of the client, drawing in data considered 
to be vital to the requirements of the organisation, whether it be 
residential location, occupation, financial status, income details, 
transactional patterns, or material assets. As personal information is 
taken to be the 'raw data' of decision-making, increasing its power of 
ll^Rule et al Preserving Individual Autonomy...' (1980) op cit, p.68 
discrimination, the proliferation of contact points often exceeds the 
strict needs of the organisation. According to Rule, this data imperative 
drives most organisations toward the collection of additional, non-
essential personal data which feeds into subsequent decision-making nevertheless. 
The costs of expanding surveillance capacity are offset in a number of 
ways. An important method of managing the costs of expansion is 
through the use of computerised data systems and telecommunications 
contacts. Writing in the 1970s and early 1980s, Rule and his colleagues 
were only just beginning to appreciate the new forms of high integrity 
identification and client tracking mechanisms now in operation, and the 
instantaneous exchange of data between organisational points and 
increasingly with the client herself, As the studies mentioned in part 
one show, routine, automatic, systematic electronic monitoring is now a 
feature of many organisations, extending surveillance capacity 
enormously. The centralisation and standardisation of data is another 
important technique. Like Westin, Rule appreciated the efficiency gains 
made through the centralisation of data collection and organisational 
structure. However, these early studies did not foresee how data is 
now rapidly networked between central points and widely distributed 
locations. A process allows the organisational flexibility of maintaining 
central control alongside increasingly, local decision-making facilitated 
by horizontal data flows across an organisation's structure. 
Organisations can exhibit both centralising and localising features in a 
global calculation of control. Rule also identifies more traditional forms 
of bureaucratic standardisation of operating procedures. The 
standardising of documentation and application of rules, regulations, 
sanctions and punishments helps to reduce the uncertainty of individual 
circumstances and introduces conditions of faimess and equity in the 
treatment of clienteles. This helps condense data into standard categories 
considered important to the organisation. Rule also points to the 
establishment of statistical techniques such as data scanning and random 
sampling for the construction of client profiles employed to 'narrow the 
attention' of systems dealing with clienteles so large that decision-
ll^Rule (1973) op cit, pp.289-292 and 301-302; see also Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy, (1980) 
op cit, p.49 
ll^See the discussion of technological changes in ibid., pp.62-3. 
ll^Rule (1973) op ciu p.285 and 302 
making derived from the mass of personalised contacts must be 
supplemented with statistical surveillance derived from both publicly 
available data and composite constructs of data previously accumulated 
by the organisation.ii^ 
Inter-organisational cooperation and the creation of the mass 
surveillance society 
The dialectic between maximising control and limiting costs is also 
addressed on a inter-organisational level. Rule's studies show that 
organisations routinely 'co-operate' to improve their own surveillance 
capacity. Client data initially shaped by a discrete organisational context, 
but of more universal application - modes of identification, client 
location, financial status, or other services subscribed to - are routinely 
exchanged among organisations in order to bolster control over their 
jurisdictions. In addition, the merging and matching of data limits the 
chances of clients 'escaping' from the wider inter-organisational system 
of control. Clients moving through separate jurisdictions can be more 
effectively monitored in this way.ii^ The tagging of data with personal 
identifiers is a useful tool for the placing of contextually discrete data in 
an overall pool of resources which can be utilised by potentially all the 
organisations participating in the system. 
According to Rule, the seemingly permanent extension of surveillance 
capacity and the growing 'symbiosis' of data gathering through inter-
organisational cooperation, is producing a mass surveillance society 
based on a 'cumulative change in the relations between the centres of of 
social power and their peripheries' Individuals are increasingly caught 
in webs of dependency on distant organisations. As the points of contact 
between organisation and client multiply, individual responsibility and 
control over the immediate conditions of social life is absorbed into 
organisational administration of services which demand compliance and 
constant accountability. This means that many of the informal 
relationships previously arranged at a local community level are re-
established and transformed by impersonal bureaucracies. This process 
l i s ^ m , p.303 
reduces individuals to the status of anonymous agents in need of constant 
identification and observation by means of d o c u m e n t a t i o n . 
Limiting surveillance 
Earlier we noted Rule's rejection of the 'efficiency criterion' assumed 
by the privacy theorists. However, in dismissing the idea that privacy 
and autonomy can be protected within a legally regulated extension of 
surveillance, Rule's solution is to shift the focus of analysis from the 
individual to the organisation itself. He believes there are several ways 
in which this can be done. Above all it means challenging the 'ideology 
of planning' which merely seeks to minimise the social problems of a 
never ending extension of bureaucratic control by increasingly efficient 
legal and administrative mechanisms. According to Rule, bureaucratic 
planners (and liberal theorists) nearly always assume that the structure 
of bureaucratic organisations and their lines of development are 'fixed 
conditions' making them impervious to restructuring. This effectively 
obscures potential altematives and the fact that a range of choices can be 
made, 
Against this perceived organisational determinism toward the 
progressive extension of control, Rule argues for a 're-allocation of 
resources' for the creation of a 'looser, more private world' based on 
'less information-intensive ways of dealing with people'. This entails the 
minimisation of highly discriminating, fine-grained decision-making by 
organisations thus breaking the pattern of cumulative information 
gathering and the progressive augmentation of personal records which 
provides the very conditions for such data discrimination. He suggests 
two inter-related methods of achieving this. Firstly, some form of 
structural reduction must take place. By decentralising and locahsing the 
setting for decision-making and by applying much broader categories of 
service, reductions in the differences between individual cases can be 
made. Presumably this will help to interrupt the information spiral that 
operates as increased data gathering power feeds into ever more detailed 
decision-making criteria. Secondly, as organisations proceed along these 
119see Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy (1980) op cit, p. 116; and Rule (1973) op cit, pp.25-27 
120Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy (1980) op cit, p. 171 
simpler lines inter-organisational exchange of data could be reduced and 
the possibility of a universal 'baseline' of personal information 
categories could conceivably be constructed which would be adequate 
for decision-making. 121 
In one of his later works Rule makes the analogy between the possibility 
of more localised and simplified 'social technologies of surveillance' and 
the 'soft energy paths' favoured by environmentalists. Massive, 
centralised surveillance systems are structured in a similar fashion to 
large scale technological systems and breed the same kinds of problems 
- 'enormous power in the hands of a few' and fewer opportunities for 
intervention in the case of malfunction. Moreover, they are largely 
destructive to their surrounding environment and operate with the 
constant danger of catastrophic breakdown. Here he takes issue with the 
seamless rationality of the 'technological optimists' that there is nothing 
inherently beneficial in the permanent extension of 'purposive control'. 
Taking a sceptical approach, Rule maintains that planning not blinded by 
the imperative of technological progress could assess and rule out 
dangerous potentiaHties before they are i m p l e m e n t e d . 1 2 2 
Rule's vision of a looser, more private world of simplified relations 
between the organisational centre and the client periphery has been 
criticised by the privacy theorists. Laudon, defending classical 
plurahsm, criticises Rule's assumption that organisational informational 
gathering has expanded through bureaucratisation or computerisation 
pointing to Westin and Baker's earlier conclusion that automation had 
led to a decline in record keeping. He resolutely defends properly 
regulated bureaucratic surveillance against the potential tyranny of 
decentralised informal social regulation. In local settings surveillance 
would be direct and physical, more personalised and free from the 
objectivity that distance and standardised procedures brings. Legally 
regulated surveillance operating form distant organisational sources is 
seen as a safeguard of pluralist democracy, not a disruptive force.123 
121/ft/J., pp.154-155 
123k.C. Laudon, 'Comment on Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society', 
in LJ. Hoffman (ed.). Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade (Academic Press Inc. New York, 
1980), p.92 
perhaps because totalitarian regimes have far more effective 
means of social control, namely local systems, we find that 
computerised personal databanks, say in the Soviet Union, the 
Eastem Bloc, China, Argentina and Brazil, are not very well 
developed at all. It may be that large, bureaucratic personal 
databanks are a sufficient, adequate means of social control 
only in relatively free, voluntaristic, consensual societies 
because they rely so much upon individual c o m p l i a n c e . 
Laudon's critique is instructive in demonstrating just how far classical 
liberalism will go in defending its core assertion that no matter how 
structurally complex modem capitalist societies have become, how 
bureaucratised they are, any social analysis must be based on the 
acceptance of the individual (rational and free) as its primary 
determinant. Even if protecting the embattled theory requires the belief 
that not only is the expression of liberal individualism unmolested by 
the reach of bureaucratism but that it is actually enhanced by the 
necessities of distance. Individuals accustomed to consensuality and 
voluntarism in their social relations will freely comply with 
bureaucratic requests if administered in a properly regulated manner. 
For this further reduces the intrusion of petty, local meddling in their 
social life. 
Problems with Rule 
While Rule's work offers a number of advances over earlier studies 
which placed the practices of surveillance in the struggles and fears of a 
cherished liberal democratic society, with the rights of individual 
privacy as its centrepiece, a more rigourous critical analysis needs to 
release the useful elements in Rule's studies from his own ideological 
assumptions of organisational pluraHsm. 
Rule's work is dominated by a pluralist perspective which undermines 
some more promising applications of the concept of surveillance 
capacity and the overall social dynamic of expansion and constraint in 
the staging of surveillance. In Rule the organisation, as the primary unit 
124//,/̂ ., p.93 
of analysis, behaves in a similar manner to sovereign individuals in 
classical theory: autonomous actors pursuing projects of rationalised 
self-interest. The rules of the organisational game are the preservation 
of identity, coherence and autonomy through the extension of control 
over the surrounding environment. The sub-set of organisational actors 
who deal with largely anonymous mass clienteles as their 'raw material', 
manifest practices of control based on the procedures of documentary 
surveillance. Organisations are presented as generic in terms of type and 
in their modes of control. They are seen as largely independent of any 
determinate source of social power and thus their location in the 
broader socio-economic structure is immaterial. In Rule's own case 
studies organisations are drawn from the both the public and private 
sector, from law enforcement, vehicle registration, credit card 
providers yet all display the need to identify, locate and regulate their 
client environment for the purposes of organisational consolidation and 
expansion. 
There is no underlying structure linking organisations together. Forms 
of organisational cooperation are purely strategic, related to the 
maximisation of client coverage by extending the volume and frequency 
of contact in the most efficient manner. The claims that his is a 
sociological analysis notwithstanding. Rule is unable to explain many of 
the questions unanswered by the privacy theorists - of why surveillance 
is unevenly distributed across society, and why certain individuals at 
certain locations attract a greater density of surveillance. 
The 'anonymous public', illuminated as targets of surveillance, are 
ascribed properties - whether it be a criminal record, financial status or 
credit worthiness - which are internal to the organisations needs. A 
typical recipient of surveillance may be a taxpayer, a credit applicant, a 
welfare client or a commercial customer, each is inculcated in sets of 
regulations discrete to each organisation. As individuals move between 
jurisdictions they attract the surveillance procedures particular to the 
organisation involved and are often subject to data exchanges from 
surrounding jurisdictions. Because each client is defined internally by 
the service providing organisation and organisations themselves subsist 
in conditions of independence there is no possibility of uncovering 
deeper structural reasons for surveillance. Individuals are simply clients 
organisation involved and are often subject to data exchanges from 
surrounding jurisdictions. Because each client is defined internally by 
the service providing organisation and organisations themselves subsist 
in conditions of independence there is no possibility of uncovering 
deeper structural reasons for surveillance. Individuals are simply clients 
of a multitude of surveillance-based organisations accumulating in 
number as the social system increases in size and complexity. In these 
circumstances a rich and powerful property owner may be a recipient 
of more organisational-surveillance contacts than an unemployed youth 
from an ethnic minority group. As a social analysis of surveillance this 
says nothing. These weaknesses are reflected in the general paucity of 
Rule's solutions to the explosion of surveillance and the growing chains 
of bureaucratic dependency. Because the explanation of surveillance is 
interpreted as simple organisational intent the solution must rest on the 
standardisation of organisational procedures, applicable across the 
board. 
A recent study that has utilised Rule's theories exemplifies some of these 
problems. Clarke shows how advances in surveillance technology have 
improved the monitoring ability of organisations as individuals move 
through distinct jurisdictions. Instantaneous, automated, auditing and 
verification techniques which draw on data from a number of separate 
locations intensify organisational control, often, as in EFTS and law 
enforcement, operating on a twenty four hour, real time basis. New 
communications technologies now allow a more rigourous 'cross system 
enforcement' making 'an individuals relationship with one organisation 
dependent on his or her performance in relation to another', thereby 
tightening the web of control. However, Clarke, like Rule, simply 
accumulates examples of organisational control with no attempt to link 
them in any systematic way. State and private sector organisations are 
not differentiated in any way, all stage surveillance programmes of 
varying sophistication, and cooperate in order to extend client coverage. 
But there is no real distinction in purpose between credit, law 
enforcement or, welfare, surveillance. 
125r A. Clarke, 'Information Technology and Dataveillance', Communications of the ACM, Vol.31, 
No.5, May 1988, pp.503-508. 
(ii) Bringing in Capitalism 1: Surveillance and Corporate 
Control 
The Work of Oscar Gandy 
The recent work of Oscar Gandyi26 displays some of the approaches 
that guided the earlier work of Rule. Like Rule he is only indirectly 
concerned with the privacy dimension of surveillance in favour of the 
broader organisational dynamics which both sustain and extend it as a 
social practice. 
However, in contrast to Rule, Gandy's work is more attuned to the 
subtle differentiation of surveillance practices, the differences in 
purpose of its operations at the major sites on the landscape of advanced 
capitalist societies and the diverse social effects on the recipients in these 
locations. Social effects are measured in terms of the controls on human 
behaviour, the obstacles to information access and the restrictions on 
effective democratic participation among the populace. 
Gandy sees intensified surveillance practices as an integral element of 
the diffusion of information technology into the processes of capitalist 
production and exchange and state bureaucratic administration. A 
diffusion geared to the 'pursuit of elusive solutions to cyclical capitalist 
crises' through the generation of new manufacturing products, increased 
productivity of labour and new techniques for 'stimulating and directing 
demand for g o o d s ' . A s in Rule, surveillance is linked to extended 
control through expansion and efficiency. But not simply that of the 
individual organisation, a wider structural efficiency of the capitalist 
system itself: 
personal information is necessary for the coordination of 
the capitalist system in all its spheres of activity: 
126O.H. Gandy, Jr. 'The Political Economy of Communications Competence', in V. Mosco and J. 
Wasko (eds) The Political Economy of Information, (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988); 
O.H. Gandy, Jr. 'The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control', 
Journal of Communication, 39 (3), Summer, 1989; O.H. Gandy Jr. 'Information Privacy and the Crisis 
of Control', in M. Raboy and P.A. Bruck (eds.). Communication For and Against Democracy (Black 
Rose Books, Montreal, 1989). 
127Gandy, 'Information privacy..', (1989) op cit, p.60 
From the plurality of organisations to the corporate governance of 
society 
Although Gandy sets up the same social dichotomy as Rule - the 
widening gap between individual and organisation - he identifies new 
forms of organisational inter-relationships and new forms of corporate 
power as the primary source of the massive extension and 
transformation of the technical means of surveillance. While Rule talked 
of organisations as essentially abstract and equivalent units cooperating 
in ways which reinforced their control over particular jurisdictions, 
Gandy is more sympathetic to the structural transformations of capitalist 
society and their determining effects on the nature of surveillance: the 
rise of new techniques of consumer surveillance; the privatisation and 
commodification of information; and the complex exchanges of this 
commodity between the state and the commercial sector via a growing 
sector of 'intermediary' organisations which specialise in personal 
information gathering. The result is a deepening 'pool of surveillance 
resources' to be drawn upon for the management of the social s y s t e m . 
As yet Gandy has only set out a brief scheme of how surveillance 
operates at the major structural sites of 'late capitalist' e c o n o m i e s . i ^ o At 
the workplace, new employees are screened for employment suitability -
a process which draws on the combined surveillance of the health and 
insurance industry; details of previous employment and sometimes 
subjected to psychological assessment. The operation of production is 
now increasingly monitored by automatic and unseen surveillance 
devices, embedded in production technology, disciplining labour 
performance and facilitating productive efficiency.i^i The state 
routinely exchanges personal information generated at particular points 
129Gandy, The Surveillance Society..', (1989), op cit, pp.61-62. See also Gandy (1988), op cit, 
pp. 108-109 
130 It should be noted that Gandy accepts the description 'late capitalism' without any explicit 
explanation. But it can be inferred from his general framework that he broadly agrees with the basic 
components of 'late capitalism, now widely accepted among critical social theorists, that the global 
capitalist economy has been beset with a series of structural crises for two decades now centred on 
periodic cycles of of overproduction, global recession, followed by periods of intense structural 
adjustment geared to the creation of favourable conditions for renewed capital accumulation. This 
usually takes the form of; the restructuring of production (labour rationalisation, technological 
innovation, development of new product lines and the global re-division of labour), increasing the pace 
of exchange through a global information network, and integrating the state into the overall 
management of capital. See E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (NLB, London, 1976), chap 1. 
l3lGandy, The Surveillance Society...' (1989), op cit, pp.66-67; and Gandy, (1988), op cit, pp.ll3-
114 
of its operation - health, insurance, tax, social security, internal security 
etc. - with commercial organisations and intermediary data specialists. 
This enhances the control of personal eUgibility for state services and 
allows the monitoring of on-going interaction between individual and 
state for the administration of its particular codes and r e g u l a t i o n s . 
However, it is the emerging techniques of consumer surveillance which 
best represent the new conditions of corporate governance and which 
illuminate the ways in which surveillance is being transformed. 
Consumer surveillance is based on a massive extension of statistical 
surveillance and Gandy points to an altemative conception of the role of 
such techniques than that considered by the privacy theorists. One that, 
focus [es] on categories of persons and behaviours, rather than 
on a particular individual, and is oriented to the prevention of 
loss....a process whereby persons (or, increasingly groups) are 
compared with empirically or theoretically developed models, 
with either key variables, or attributes, or a combination of 
attributes...the easiest and most rapidly growing form of 
surveillance made possible through telecommunications 
links.133 
In what might be called the new technologies of consumption, the 
practices of profiling identifies consumers as composite statistical 
constructs based on sets of variables deemed important to the emerging 
consumption industry. Gandy reviews some of the new consumer 
profiling techniques conducted via new forms of 'organisational 
cooperation', combining vertical integration and horizontal 
conglomeration, cutting across the consumption sector (banks, 
publishers, media networks and marketing specialists, credit 
p r o v i d e r s ) . 134 Examples of the mass profiling techniques of 
BehaviourScan, PRIZM, VALS, and VISIONS thoroughly dissolve the 
old distinctions between statistical and intelligence data in a process 
which utilises new communications technologies to target individual 
consumers and mixes their individual receptivity to new products with a 
132Gandy, "Information Privacy...', (1989), op cit, pp.61-62; and Gandy, The Surveillance Society...', 
(1989), op cit, pp.68-69 
133Gandy, 'Information Privacy...', (1989), op cit, p.61 
134Gandy, The Surveillance Society...', (1989), op cit, p.73 
mass of broader demographic data, derived, for example, from 
PRIZM's zip-code determined socio-economic clusters. The emerging 
consumer category is enhanced by traditional consumer survey methods 
which add a psychographic element (in terms of product-related needs, 
desires, motivations) to the process . 
As is to be expected given his avowed critical stance, Gandy interprets 
the effects of the new surveillance as the extension and intensification of 
existing patterns of socio-economic power. Rule's conception of an 
homogeneous expansion of 'social control' through the incorporation of 
socially neutral individuals into webs of dependency is transformed into 
a much sharper analysis of the uneven distributional effects of corporate 
social power. Gandy maintains that the informational imiverse of late 
capitalism, with its complex exchanges of informational commodities, 
its new patterns of cooperation in the ownership and control of 
production and content of information along with the sophisticated 
techniques of mass profiling present new obstacles to democratic 
participation. Existing social inequities are intensified as already 
marginalised social groups are denied access to this information 
infrastructure. 
because of the increasing commoditisation and privatisation of 
information, and because of mounting personal and social 
deficits, the poor, especially among black and ethnic minority 
groups, are largely unable to utilise information resources to 
improve the quality of their lives. This aspect of 
communications competence, the abihty to understand the 
world so as to act to change it, is only one variable in the 
equation of inequality^^^ 
The new surveillance heightens social fragmentation through a series of 
divisive methods. The practices of locating, targeting, classifying the 
social mass into product-related Hfestyle categories further reduces the 
possibility of coherent alternative social practices which challenge the 
structures of social power from emerging. In the media constructions of 
social reality, increasingly oriented to the marketing of consumer 
135Gandy, (1989), op cit, pp.116-120 
136im, p.109 
commodities, and itself dependent on sophisticated forms of 
surveillance, many social groups are simply i n v i s i b l e . in Gandy's 
work social control is given a specificity of purpose not apparent in 
Rule. Organisations do not simply cooperate and interrelate to extend 
jurisdictional coverage, they are linked to the structural dynamics of 
capitalism. , 
The Work of Kevin Wilson 
Wilson's study of 'home networking', i.e. the provision of interactive 
electronic information and entertainment services into subscribing 
homes, contextualises and extends Rule's theory of surveillance-based 
social control and provides a more concrete, empirical study of 
corporate co-operation in the staging of consumer s u r v e i l l a n c e . 
The short history of the videotex phenomenon in the US and Westem 
Europe confirms some of Gandy's insights into the emerging corporate 
structure of consumer surveillance. Videotex and teletext technology 
initially offered the potential for the delivery of a wide range of 
information services from an array of service providers from both the 
public and private sectors. Early optimists talked not only of the 
delights of telebanking and teleshopping but new forms of 
teledemocracy through viewer participation in issues of public 
c o n c e r n . 139 Yet, as Wilson points out it was the advertising, retailing, 
and the financial services sectors who were quick to spot the enormous 
future potential of the medium and who have since monopolised the 
industry. For videotex offered not only the advantage of instantaneous 
two-way communication between the corporate sector and the domestic 
home but could also capitalise on the most successful mass 
communications medium in operation. Moreover, a medium whose 
programming structure and message content had been historically 
137Gandy maintains that the black American underclass has been further marginalised not only because 
it is not represented in the circulation of electronic imagery but also because of its poorly developed 
'communications competence' - a result of its poorer to access to new information technologies and its 
higher levels functional illiteracy and generally lower educational standards. Gandy, (1989) op cit, 
pp. 110-11 
138k.G. Wilson, The Technologies of Control (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988) 
139For the early days of videotex see, V. Mosco, Pushbutton Fantasies (Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, 
1982), pp.74-78; for a discussion of some of the early community-controlled videotex projects, 
involving public service interactions between public authorities and students, senior citizens, and 
employees, see L.B. Becker, 'A Decade of Research on Interactive Cable', in W.H. Dutton, J.G. Blumer 
and K.L. Kraemer (eds.), Wired Cities (GK Hall and Co, Boston, Mass. 1987), pp. 103-109 
shaped by the imperatives of the commercial advertising sector. 
Videotex soon became an experimental tool of mass consumer 
surveillance. 
As some of the worlds largest corporations moved into the industry, 
interesting forms of vertical and horizontal integration began to appear. 
These new joint ventures expanded the corporate partnerships already in 
place in other sectors of the consumption industry. Financial institutions 
(Chemical Bank, Citibank, Merril Lynch, American Express) joined 
with publishers (McGraw-Hill, New York Times, Readers Digest, Time 
Inc.), retailers (J.C. Penney, Sears-Roebuck and Grand Union) and 
information deliverers (Warner, AT&T, RCA, Nymex) in 
experimenting with new techniques of identifying, targeting and 
classifying individual consumers with product messages and 
instantaneous purchase and credit facilities. All this presented in a 
package of consumption-oriented entertainment, i^i 
As a new form of surveillance, videotex, according to Wilson, extends 
the surveillance capacity of the organisational core and adds a new level 
of efficiency to the staging of surveillance itself. Wilson proceeds from 
what Rule identifies as the central feature of modem mass surveillance, 
the management of social control through the perpetual increase in the 
points of interaction between the organisation and its chentele. 
home networking will provide the perfect technological 
solution to the problem of augmenting points of contact in 
systems of public surveillance. Moreover, it will do this on 
scale and with an efficiency which clearly could not be 
effected otherwise 
Just as documentational links between core and client periphery 
provided a context of dependency between client and organisation, 
videotex promises to 'effectively integrate the individual into an 
expanding network of computer-based c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ' . 1 4 3 
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Just as documentational links between core and client periphery 
provided a context of dependency between client and organisation, 
videotex promises to 'effectively integrate the individual into an 
expanding network of computer-based c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ' . 
According to Wilson, videotex provides a number of novel solutions to 
the on-going dialectic between the imperative of extending surveillance 
capacity and the resulting economic constraints. Videotex increases the 
frequency and quality of contacts between the core and clientele as a 
result of its reach into the domestic home. Client interaction through the 
watching of programmes, the response to surveys, quizzes, and product 
marketing tests and the purchase of products can proceed with 
increasing ease in the comfort and security of the home. There is a new 
measure of efficiency in the automation of service provision and the 
rapidity of client response, collapsing traditional barriers of time and 
distance between centre and periphery, Wilson foresees a further 
enhancement in the effective management of the clientele as the data 
generated through interaction increases in quantity and quality. This is 
facilitated through a mix of data surveillance techniques. An initial 
exhaustive client survey is administered in order to identify and locate 
clients and for the compilation of critical consumption-related data such 
as financial status, occupation, home ownership, type of car, spouse, 
and children, and psychographic data for the analysis of consumption 
habits and drives. Once the subscriber is set in place high quality data 
relating to his real-time participation in the service can be continuously 
generated. The resulting 'informational commodity' can be utilised for 
further marketing of new products, including the construction of real 
time testing conditions, never before available to marketers. This 
commodity is also circulated among the corporate participants for their 
own organisationally-specific p u r p o s e s . 
While Gandy and Wilson show how surveillance is deeply incorporated 
in the technologies of capitalist social control, and thus overcome the 
problems in Rule's work, several critical studies have explored what is 
really the key feature of social control, that of the enforcement of 
143/i,/^/., p . 9 7 
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individual discipline to the changing structural requirements of capital 
itself. 
(iii) Bringing in Capitalism 2: Surveillance as Capitalist 
Discipline 
Foucault was the first to explore the role of surveillance in the 
application of social discipline and his elaboration of discourse and 
power has had a considerable influence on contemporary radical studies 
of surveillance as a mode of capitalist discipline. It is worth studying his 
social theory in some detail in order to draw out the potential it offers 
for contemporary surveillance, how it is being applied in recent studies, 
and as a prelude to further possibilities. 
Foucault: Surveillance and Power 
For Foucault the specific techniques of surveillance are a central 
component in the strategic utilisation of discourse in precise institutional 
settings. Discourse has a 'double functionality', it is a form of 
knowledge and an application of power. He has studied the generic 
anatomy of discourse as the construction of particular objects of 
knowledge, the ordering of the object domain, the constitution of human 
subjects as discursive objects, and the modes of discipline and 
distribution of docile, utilisable, bodies. 
For Foucault, social discipline is embedded in the very mode of seeing 
which underlies scientific, bureaucratic, therapeutic, juridical 
discourses. The gaze which orders the world as defined grids of object-
relations. In his early work The Order of Things he locates the 
appearance of eighteenth century discourses which signal a withdrawal 
from the world into representation. The new analysis of wealth, natural 
history , and general grammar constitute a field of mobile sign relations 
attracting meaning only from their position in the field. Wealth no 
longer 'inscribed' in the bearer but 'coinable', exchangeable, constantly 
circulating, attracting value in terms of this exchange;i46 a natural 
history based on the 'visual' interrogation of plants and animals, 
classifying 'series' of identity and difference in complex taxonomic 
146m. Foucault, The Order of Things (Tavistock Publications, London, 1986), pp. 174-175. 
dispelling it of humours, essences. The new instruments of surgery 
dissect it while the practices of social hygiene segregate it from the 
collective social body 
In his later work Discipline and Punish Foucault explores the 
domination of the 'gaze' in terms of institutionalised discipline - the set 
of discursive techniques arising in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries aimed at producing docile yet useful bodies.i'^s 
The 'social' body is segregated into a series of institutional collectivities 
- the hospital, the prison, the barracks, the asylum and the school - and 
is subjected to precise technologies of discipline which order its 
functions through time and space. Foucault describes two disciplinary 
mechanisms which classify and order the social body into a utilisable 
force. 
Firstly, there are the technologies of individualisation in which the 
social body is divided, segmented, and enclosed, in order to 'transform 
the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered 
m u l t i p l i c i t i e s ' . T h i s is a process of specialisation which cuts across 
functional-behavioural, spatial and chronological dimensions. The 
imposition of a hierarchical system of rank fixes temporary location and 
'circulates' and 'distributes' individuals in a 'network of relations' . 
Bodies are ranked by space - rows of desks, beds, cells, corridors, 
courtyards, compartments. Enclosures for the classification and 
separation of individuals through the creation of difference in the 
apphcation institutional norms and regulations. Progress, character and 
cleanliness differentiate school children while patients are segregated by 
degree, symptom and condi t ion . i ^o The classification table is the 
defining technological artefact of this disciplinary moment. Discipline 
by behavioural function bisects time in the precise structuration of 
behavioural and chronological segments. Foucault quotes a nineteenth 
century educationalist: 
YoxxcàvM, Discipline and Punish (Penguin, London, 1991) 
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^^ îbid., pp.146-147 
8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 the monitor's summons, 
8.56 the entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the children 
go to their benches, 9.04 the first slate...^^^ 
This process of accumulating 'duration', attempts the extraction of an 
inexaustive usage of time by intensive segmentation, increasing the 
usefulness of the body as an applied force. The nineteenth century 
factory is the classic 'functional site' which combines the functional, 
spatial and chronological dimensions of the mechanisms of 
individualisation. 152 
Secondly, there are the disciplinary mechanisms of totalisation in the re-
articulation of the assembly of functional and spatial segments into a 
'new combination of forces' directed to particular institutional ends. 
The social body as a carefully constructed machine. 
the unit - regiment, battalion, section and, later, division -
became a sort of machine with many parts, moving in relation 
to one another, in order to arrive at a configuration and to 
obtain a specific result. 
in short, the need to invent a machinery whose principle 
would no longer be the mobile or immobile mass, but a 
geometry of divisible segments.i53 
The techniques of individualisation and totahsation should not be read as 
isolated, discrete or contradictory processes. They are two moments of 
the shifting and strategic 'combinations' of bodies as forces. This 
'coercion' of bodies can be seen as the placement of time-space grid on 
the collective social body. Discipline is enforced by the establishment of 
points of surveillance inserted between hierarchical and functional levels 
as well as at the distributed points of spatial enclosure. Thus, 
surveillance is dispersed and routinised, operating at multiple locations. 
A process in which all positions, divisions and behaviours are seen by an 
impersonal gaze no longer emanating from a central point of control. 




surveillance is dispersed and routinised, operating at multiple locations. 
A process in which all positions, divisions and behaviours are seen by an 
impersonal gaze no longer emanating from a central point of control. 
The famous metaphor of the panopticon represents the perfect form of 
surveillance in which an unseen gaze produces an 'anticipatory 
c o n f o r m i t y ' . 154 However, i t is mistaken to assume that this is the only 
example of surveillance Foucault used. Points of observation are less 
impressive and often mundane - raised observatories in drill grounds, 
the strategic placement of superiors and supervisors between dormitory 
beds, at ends of corridors, in between workstations. Performance was 
timed, examined, assessed, judged by finely graded codes, regulations, 
statutes, rules - elaborate 'micro-penalties' enforcing obedience with the 
threat of p u n i s h m e n t . 5̂5 Modes of surveillance are essential to the 
stabilisation of the disciplinary complex, through the applied 'penalty of 
t h e n o r m ' . 156 
The disciplinary complex, punctuated by surveillance means that bodies 
are elements in an imposed system of relations and accrue identity by 
their behavioural and spatial location on the time-space grid. Meaning, 
identity, utility are constructed through position, function and 
performance. Distributed and hierarchical surveillance is the major 
source of the stream of documentation which accumulates through the 
perpetual observation, assessment, profiling, confinement and 
punishment of individuals passing through the disciplinary network. 
Identity and personal history are 'objectified' in documentation. 
Individuals become 'cases' and 'case h i s t o r i e s ' . 
For Foucault, the subject of surveillance is never pre-formed, as in 
liberal theory with its carefully demarcated reahn of privacy and its 
formal rights, obHgations and protections, but is constituted as a special 
discursive object by the complexes of surveillance-based disciplinary 
techniques themselves. Individuals emerge as 'subjects' in the very 
practices of surveillance. 
154For a description of Bentham's proposed panopticon see, ibid., pp.200-208. 
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Webster and Robins: The 'electronic gaze' and 'cybernetic capitalism 
The work of Webster and Robins^^s throughout the 1980s shares the 
same point of departure as that of Gandy and Wilson but differs in its 
utilisation of Foucault. Nevertheless, they follow a similar pattern of 
investigation as that of Gandy and Wilson, beginning with the defining 
feature of contemporary surveillance practices - their integration in the 
overall dynamic of capital accumulation, permitting a tightening of 
control by way of the intensive monitoring of the production and 
circulation of commodities, especially new forms of information 
commodities. Webster and Robins also examine the ways in which 
surveillance is deeply implicated in the stimulation of consumption, as it 
improves the visibility of consumption pattems, and operates as an 
important mode of identifying and selling ever new and diversified 
products. In this way it is linked to the continual commodification of the 
spaces and functions of social life. 
However, unlike Gandy and Wilson, Webster and Robins' explanations 
of the changing strategies of accumulation are not limited to the surface 
economics of corporate power, the methods and technologies utilised in 
the drive to rationalise production and exchange and expand market 
reach. Their aim is to expose the changing forms of capitalist discipline 
which reduce citizens to functional elements of capital and permit its 
perpetual extension and control. They do this by blending two discrete 
theories of the mechanics of modem social discipline. By way of 
Foucault's elaboration of institutionalised panoptical discipline, and by 
theories of social discipline specific to capitahst conditions, Taylorism 
and Fordism. 
We have seen that in Foucault's studies of panoptical discipline 
institutional practices are not linked to, or a result of, any specific 
socio-economic determination. In other words panoptical discipline is 
not necessarily a form of capitalist discipline, its operations are not 
shaped by the law of value. Foucault was mainly concerned with what 
he termed the 'microphysics of power' in the cellular imposition of 
158f. Webster and K. Robins, Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis (Ablex, Norwood, NJ, 
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Slaves Without Athens? - The Neurosis of Technology', Science as Culture, No.3, 1988 
production of a docile, manipulable body, isolated, compartmentalised, 
classified and trained for the daily reproduction of detailed behavioural 
tasks. The imposed temporal-spatial grid was itself punctuated at every 
cornice by permanent, yet unseen surveillance. Webster and Robins 
utilise Foucault in two ways which combine to extend his analysis to the 
processes of contemporary accumulation patterns. Firstly, they replace 
the institutional gaze with the 'electronic eye' of modem information 
technologies operative at increasingly dispersed points across the social 
landscape of late capitalism. Second, they study how panoptical 
discipline is effected in a global socio-economic structure free of the 
multitude of visible boundaries and enclosures which characterised 
Foucault's nineteenth century institutions. 
we want to suggest that the new communication and information 
technologies - particularly in the form of the electronic grid 
towards which they are moving - permit a massive extension of 
that same principle of mobilisation to which Bentham [the 
author of the panopticon] aspired. What these technologies 
support, in fact, is the same dissemination of power and control, 
but freed from the architectural and geographic constraints of 
Bentham's stone and brick prototype. On the basis of the 
information revolution, not just the prison or the factory, but 
the social totality, comes to be part of the hierarchical and 
disciplinary panoptic machine^^^ 
The new electronic gaze is distributed across the social whole 
monitoring the labour process, tracking circulation, illuminating 
consumption patterns, and penetrating domestic space. Yet unlike 
Foucault's panoptical gaze which is infused in a disciplinary structuring 
which excludes no one, a hierarchical distribution of power in which the 
watchers are also watched from another level, the dispersed 
technologies of the electronic eye are owned and operated by an 
increasing concentration of transnationalised companies and highly 
centralised modem s t a t e s . i ^ o According to Webster and Robins, the 
most important feature of corporate-dominated electronic panopticism 
is the way that it allows the decentralisation of observation and control, 
I59webster and Robins (1986), op du p.346 
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expressed at 'multiple and differential' nodes on the grid, while at the 
same time allowing an increasing centralisation of corporate power. The 
'electronic grid is a transparent structure in which activities taking place 
at the "periphery" - remote working, electronic banking, the 
consumption of information or entertainment, teleshopping, and 
communication - are always visible to the electronic eye'.i^i The flow of 
information along corporately operated networks fuses observation and 
power in a single disciplinary process. Individuals as workers, 
consumers, citizens find their movements tracked and their transactions 
audited thereby aligning individual behaviour ever more closely to 
corporate codes of practice. The electronic eyes of the corporate centres 
illuminate the multitude of interactions between people and capital 
across space and through time. Such exhaustive examination also 
provides the basis for improvements and adjustments to the interface 
with capital, extending and rationalising its control. xhe disciplinary 
aspect of the electronic grid is most effectively enforced in the sphere of 
consumption: 
people themselves will be increasingly relegated to the status of 
data; their actions and transactions will be recorded as digits and 
ciphers by the ubiquitous and always watching information 
machines. Already credit agencies, finance houses and large 
retailers are constructing databases on customers and potential 
customers, categorising them, analysing them, scrutinising their 
movements, that they might be used to the optimum benefit of 
the corporation. 163 
Like Wilson and Gandy, Webster and Robins point to the ability of 
corporations to harvest growing volumes of consumer transaction and 
performance data which are then channelled into the advertising and 
marketing sectors for the construction and targeting of consumer 
imagery and product messages. According to Webster and Robins this is 
creating a 'cybernetic' relationship between the production and 
consumption of consumer commodities. Surveillance data is ordered to 
produce highly differentiated consumer categories of particular needs 
1 6 1 , m , pp.60-61 
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and desires which, in turn, mirror the use value of (increasingly 
useless) products.i64 
An important feature of 'cybernetic capitalism' is the gradual 
consumerisation of domestic and community space. Webster and Robins 
claim that the extension of the logic of consumption into traditional 
community patterns of behaviour further shifts the balance of social 
power toward capital. The abundance of community skills and the rich 
pool of cultural knowledge which once facilitated education, 
entertainment and communication, all necessary for the maintenance of 
community cohesion and identity, are being replaced not only by 
distant, bureaucratised state services but by what Illich has termed, the 
'professionally engineered information commodity'^^^. A form of 
'social taylorism expanding beyond its origins in production to a wider 
cultural deskilling. Just as the skilled worker has been increasingly 
dispossessed of his power through job simplification, fragmentation and 
mechanisation, the citizen is stripped to the singularity of a largely 
passive consumer. The one dimensional lifeworld of passive 
consumption follows closely the social dynamics of production on the 
shopfloor - isolation, fragmentation, and alienation. An important aspect 
of this is the partial relegation of the consumer, and maybe in the 
future, the worker, into the privatised, domestic space of the home. 
This drift toward a privatised individual existence, more conducive to 
the needs of capital cannot be compared to the universalised private 
sphere of the liberal surveillance theorists. It is a space punctuated and 
penetrated by the information technologies of consumption and as we 
shall see the prime target for the practices of consumer surveillance. 
Mark Poster's 'superpanopticism' 
Poster points to several difficulties in the application of Foucault's 
nineteenth century studies in modem conditions. He claims that the 
disappearance of the spatial and temporal coordinates which 
^^ibid., p.67 p.66 
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distinguishes electronic panopticism from the Benthamite prototype pose 
new problems for the maintenance of discipline in late capitalist 
f o r m a t i o n s . 167 i n Foucault's studies a central aspect of the disciplining 
process was the construction of specific identities shaped by the 
disciplinary technologies which classified, partitioned and trained 
individuals. As we have seen in Webster and Robins, electronic 
panopticism is devoid of the spatial and temporal coordinates which are 
essential for the constitution of the prisoner, the insane, the hospital 
patient. While they maintained that the new observers behind the 
technologies of electronic surveillance were the powerful agents of 
transnational capital. Poster returns to Foucault's belief that there is no 
privileged point of observation, all are positioned through the 
mechanics of its operation. The disappearance of both the structural 
coordinates of panopticism and the privileged observer means discipline 
must be somehow enforced by the streams of electronic traces delivered 
through the operations of surveillance itself. Poster asks how is 
discipline assured when it is limited to only the manipulation of signs? 
In answering this Poster takes up the theme of the radical theorists of 
surveillance, by examining how the continual stream of data is used to 
constitute new subjectivities. Gandy, Wilson, and Webster and Robins 
have indicated that detailed construction of consumer categories is 
becoming essential for the disciplining of consumption around new and 
diversified product lines. Yet there has thus far been little explanation 
of the actual mechanics of this discipline in the consumer, or other, 
contexts. Poster maintains that discipline is affected by the participation 
of the population in its 'own self-constitution as subjects of the 
normalising gaze of the superpanopticon'. There are three aspects to 
this. Firstly, the gradual drift to digitalisation of data not only enables 
ease of storage and rapidity of manipulation and dissemination it also 
provides a completely unambiguous language of representation. 168 
Previous forms of representation, such as writing, were materially 
framed and displayed traces of its origins, they were still forms of 
communication that presupposed a reader who was subjected to various 
forms of influence and authority evident in the materiality of the 
message. For example, books come with an identified author and a 
167m. Poster, The Mode of Information (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990), p.86 
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publisher which signifies a type of authority, and a cultural context. The 
old crafts of bookmaking and publishing left traces of workmanship 
indicative of productive practices of the time and occasional errors and 
misprintings reminded the reader that texts were the product of a 
'community of w o r k e r s ' . i 6 9 i n contrast databases construct fields of 
relations between variables free on any mediating context, but based on 
a new limiting grid: 
a database arranges information in rigidly defined categories or 
fields. When viewed on a computer monitor or printed out on 
paper each field is a column and each record is a row. Each 
field contains a limited number of spaces and if the field is for 
dates or numbers, entries into it are even more limited in their 
form. Speed and efficiency of the database varies directly with 
the fixity of the form in which the information appears in it. A 
database might consist of the following fields: an individuals 
first and last name, social security number, street address, city, 
state, zip code, phone number, age, sex, race, unpaid parking 
violations, x-rated video cassettes rented, subscriptions to 
communist periodicals.The agency that collects the information 
constitutes individuals according to these p a r a m e t e r s . i ^ o 
Each field is complete and discrete and the absence of any contextual 
trace which might complicate the clarity of the field or introduce doubt 
into the relations it enters with others is excluded by design. The 
permutations are endless, and can be created and transmitted 
instantaneously. 
Secondly, the individual participates in his own surveillance every time 
he passes through a transaction point. He is implicated in his own 
d i s c i p l i n e . i ^ i Thirdly, this self-initiated and maintained accumulation of 
data leads to a 'multiplication of the individual'. The individual finds 
himself confronted at many points by an 'additional self, closely 
approximating some statistical norm developed by the particular needs 
of agencies across the social landscape. Moreover, this statistical self 
'may be acted upon to the detriment of the "real" self without that "real" 
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self ever being aware of what is h a p p e n i n g * . xhe overall effect is the 
production of a stabilising normality evolving in line with an 
increasingly multifaceted administration of social life. 
Electronic Panopticism: Problems and Possibilities 
The utilisation of Foucault's discursive method produces a number of 
insights into the role and nature of surveillance in the saturated 
informational conditions of late capitalism. However, despite the 
modifications which Webster and Robins, and Poster have made in 
order to understand the disciplinary processes of contemporary 
surveillance there are still some methodological features of Foucault's 
work which do not translate easily into specifically capitalist 
applications of surveillance, and which obscure the actual mechanisms 
of disciplinary surveillance in these social systems. 
Recall that for Foucault observation and discipline are fused into the 
application of discourse. There is no 'outside' of the disciplinary 
apparatus, no extemal 'big brother' standing free of its mechanisms and 
commanding its operations. In Foucault's terms, there is no privileged 
'subject' which is not itself constituted as a discursive object at some 
point, whether it be an impersonal 'big brother', a government, a 
bureaucracy, a massive international corporation, or even, a dominant 
class or mode of production. This means that the incorporation of 
Foucault into a radical political economy of capitalist discipline which 
posits, explicitly or implicitly, a single determinate process - the 
production and circulation of commodities - and a totalising conception 
of the social system, derived from this privileged moment, poses 
problems. We have seen that Webster and Robins modified Foucault by 
designating two extemal subjects, transnational capital and the 
burgeoning apparatus of the state, as the primary operator and 
beneficiary of electronic panopticism, utilising information technology 
in ways which decentralise the mechanics of social control while 
simultaneously centralising corporate power. 
In contrast. Poster suggests that informational capitalism enforces 
individual discipline through the manipulation of the mass of 
p . 9 8 
In contrast, Poster suggests that informational capitalism enforces 
individual discipline through the manipulation of the mass of 
transactional traces generated through the interface between individuals 
and various data gathering agents. Individuals are confronted with 
complex data profiles nominally representing themselves but internally 
structured in ways which primarily represent the interests of particular 
agencies. The resulting multiplication of the individual into an array of 
data subjects, partly generated by the individual herself, is then used as a 
disciplinary weapon. Unfortunately, Poster makes no attempt to show 
how this discipline is effected. There may be good reasons for this. In 
Foucault the disciplinary constitution of individuals as data subjects 
(institutional 'cases') was only part of the larger physical architecture of 
discipline which in the prison, for example, used partitioning walls, 
cells, watchtowers, training yards etc. to produce the results the 
institution required. Poster rightly maintains that the physical 
architecture of Nineteenth century discipline has been superseded by the 
essentially invisible processes of electronic panopticism. However, in 
doing this, he overlooks the vast technological infrastructure which 
facilitates contemporary panopticism and which is fused into its 
operations. Similarly, Webster and Robins do not explicitly spell out 
how discipline is maintained in contemporary informationalised 
societies. Yet the complex forms of discipline in these societies can be 
better appreciated if the mechanics of surveillance are more visible. 
Part three below is an exploration of how modern panoptical 
surveillance is staged in the sector of mass consumption, concentrating 
especially on new forms of electronically mediated consumption. 
PART THREE: THE MECHANICS OF ELECTRONIC 
DISCIPLINE 
(i) The Mobilisation and Discipline of Consumption: the 
Example of Electronic Funds Transfer 
There are three broad features of the staging of surveillance in 
consumption. Firstly, there is the continuing proliferation of 
information and communication technologies linked to the 
administration of consumption, its expansion and intensification. 
Secondly, these technologies are providing the beginnings of an 
integrated circuit of consumption wiring up banks, credit card 
operators, finance companies, retail outlets, travel agents, hotels, hire 
cars, restaurants, airports, and of course, the consumer. And, thirdly, 
this inter-connectivity is increasingly facilitated by a digitally-operated 
international business network which transmits and manipulates 
information gathered at the mass of transaction points across the 
landscape of consumption, connecting the agents of commercial and 
financial capital in new pattems of combination. 
Embedded in this architecture of consumption is a complex form of 
surveillance-based consumer discipline which attempts to: 
(i) mobilise individuals into following definite spatial pattems of 
consumption determined by leading corporate agents in the 
consumption sector. 
(ii) ensure consumer performance at points of consumption 
follows prescribed rules through the application of a series of 
'micro-penalties'. 
(iii) inculcate into citizens a personal ideology of consumption by 
identifying and targeting them as consumer prospects via the 
process of consumer categorisation. 
Electronically-mediated consumption: electronic funds transfer. 
The development of EFT over the last decade is providing a number of 
economic benefits for banking capital. A recent study has shown that 
nearly 90% of the six types of payment between institution and 
customer - cash purchase, deposit of cash to an account, withdrawal of 
cash from an account, transfer of cash by a payment order, debit 
transfer from one account to another, credit transfer from one account 
to another - have become automated. This has led to reductions in the 
labour component of transactional processing through the partial 
elimination of paper artefacts and costly paper transfers between 
institutions. In addition the EFTPOS sub-system is producing definite 
benefits for retailers through the electronic integration of the central 
features of the retailing process - instantaneous updating of sales 
recorded and volume and type of stock moved. EFTPOS also provides 
joint benefits to banks and retailers through the collapsing of the spatial 
and temporal distance between banking and consumption, and the 
instantaneous transfer of funds between networked banks and 
retailers. 174 
The electronic interface between consumers, banks and retailers has led 
to privacy concerns that data which illuminates patterns of consumer 
movement between transaction points might be distributed to outside 
state agencies such as the police and welfare. There are also fears that 
individually identified transaction data might be used for purposes other 
than that consented to by the consumer such as direct marketing 
operations. There is already evidence that data pooled by banks and 
retailers is being used for marketing p u r p o s e s . i ^ s The concentration on 
privacy once again obscures other disciplinary elements embedded in 
EFTS. Two broad categories of consumer discipline are secured 
through EFTS. Firstly, there is an overall tension between the 
incitement to consume and the instantaneous, automated application of 
penalties for consumer transgression of the stipulated mles of consumer 
performance decided by the banks and enforced by retailers. Secondly, 
as has already been noted, EFT/EFTPOS is creating a circuit of 
electronically-mediated consumption which is tying consumer purchase 
173OECD op cit, p.24 
174ASTEC op ciu p.90 
175OECD op cit, p.80; and ASTEC op cit, p. 122 
to funds through automatic teller machines (ATMs) has complemented 
the extension of retail trading hours. A combination which frees 
consumption time from traditional business hours, including as it does, 
working hours. Increasingly banks, building societies, and credit unions 
are cooperating to allow customers access to each others ATM faciUties. 
EFTPOS removes further obstacles to consumption, improving even on 
the 24 hour availability of ATMs, by combining banking and shopping 
at the site of consumption itself. A recent trend has been toward the 
integration of hitherto separate elements of modem consumption -
cheques, credit cards, ATM cards, in-house loan cards - into single 
multi-purpose cards which maximises the ease of shopping.176 For 
example the American Express Gold Card can be used not only to access 
cash on a 24 hour basis at thousands of sites across the globe as well as 
access to EFTPOS facilities but is also connected to a flow of credit 
from the American Express Bank. More recently, homebanking 
provisions are beginning to extend the network directly into the home. 
Of course, the incitement to consume is tempered by the limits on the 
availability of personal funds and the ability of consumers to satisfy 
credit repayment schedules. The strategy of banks, is to do their part in 
driving consumption levels constantly up to a level where clients are 
permanently caught in interest paying credit traps, but never to the 
point where they are unable to repay. Once customers fall foul of these 
rules of the game a battery of penalties are activated. Individuals 
attempting to push consumption beyond personal limits are 
automatically penahsed at cash dispensers and at the point of sale. Cards 
fraudulently used are swallowed up. Those unable to meet credit 
repayments find that their floor limits are reduced and eventually 
further credit is denied and EFTPOS access is withdrawn. The exclusion 
of those flouting credit rules is maintained by the circulation of so-
called 'blacklists' generated by, and circulated amongst, credit reference 
agencies and credit providers as well as major retailers. These lists are 
records of current bankrupts, multiple bankrupts, known aliases, recent 
credit cancellations, lost, missing, unretumed and fraudulently obtained 
cards. 
176asTEC op cit, p.91 
177xhe Privacy Committee, Consumer Credit Reporting: An Overview (AGPS, Canberra, 1979), 
pp.46-52 
This disciplined mobilisation of consumption can only operate via a vast 
global telecommunications network providing rapid exchanges of 
transaction data. For the system to work at its optimum, data must flow 
on a real time basis between the data hubs of different banking 
companies, from bank headquarters to the branch periphery, from 
individual banks to the dispersed points of consumer interface, and 
between the thousands of nodes of the banking system as a whole and the 
participating retail data system. In reality it is only partially automated 
and does not operate on a fully real time basis. However, the 
architecture of an integrated system is being put in place. A global 
network of data flows between bank headquarters via the SWIFT 
network, which utilises the INTELNET satellite s y s t e m . 1 7 8 EFTS 
transactional data flows from the point of customer interface to national 
automated clearing houses which allows customer access to ATMs 
located at banks other than that with which they hold an account. In 
Australia retailers and banks participating in EFTPOS are connected via 
centralised switching centres operated by the national PTT, T e l e c o m . 
In addition, retailers and banks transmit customer financial information 
between their own corporate centres and dispersed branch peripheries 
using the International Business Service sateUite system which provides 
direct satellite access. The introduction of miniaturised satellite 
transmission and receiving systems, VSATs, now allows retailing 
companies operating in-house credit facilities to provide instantaneous, 
central validation of credit transactions generated at scattered branches. 
In the US, K-Mart links its 2100 stores in this way.i^o 
The application of instantaneous, automated micropenalties, facilitated 
by the transference of data from point to centre and back again, is 
complemented by emerging forms of corporate integration and service 
diversification which are culminating in the control of systems of 
electronically-mediated consumption which discipline consumer 
I^SR.T. Clark, "Electronic Funds Transfer: The Creeping Revolution', Telecommunications Policy, 
Vol.8, No.l, p!40 
1'79ASTEC, op cit, pp.38-41; see also J. Langdale, 'Electronic Funds Transfer and the 
Internationalisation of the Banking and Finance Industry, Geoforum, Vol. 16, No.l, 1985, pp. 5-6. 
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Commitment to Strategic Telecom Use', Transnational Data and Communications Report, 
July/August, 1992, p.39 
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performance to specific patterns determined by the corporate operators. 
In the last decade new forms of international service alliances between 
retailers, bankers, hoteliers, airlines, tourist services and fast food 
chains have developed. For example. Sears Roebuck, the worlds largest 
retailer has diversified into videotex (the Home Shopping Channel) as 
well as insurance and financial services in order to more closely align 
the provision of credit with the consumption of its products.^^i Through 
its ownership of Allstate Mortgage and Insurance Co., as well as 
Coldwell Barker, the largest real estate broker in the US, Sears is able 
to internalise consumption of a number of products - financial, 
retailing, insurance and home purchase - by merging, matching and 
extending customer data in ways which enhance the operations of each 
discrete a r e a . American Express combine travel facilities (American 
Express card, travellers cheques and travel services) with private 
banking services and the QUBE interactive cable c o m p a n y , a l l o w i n g 
both the extension of electronic credit along international tourist circuits 
and a ever closer control over the steps of consumption - the facilitation 
of credit, the targeted advertising of products into the domestic home 
and the provision of instantaneous purchase facilities via electronic 
payment transfer. Close alliances have formed between hotels and 
airlines and general travel services. This means that combinations such 
as American Express, United Airlines and Hilton hotels can offer 
complex packages which lay out intemational circuits of consumption, 
which not only stimulates consumption in ways mutually advantageous 
to the corporate participants, but at each point on the circuit 
performance discipHne can be enforced. In addition data generated at 
various points on the circuit can be channelled back into the future 
marketing of products. The United Nations Centre for Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) maintains that linkages are extending between 
airlines, tour operators, and car rental agencies, many of which are 
owned by airiines themselves. In addition, most service corporations are 
also diversifying internally, combining market research, advertising 
(often in conjunction with intemational advertising houses such as 
181K.M. Davidson, Megamergers (Ballinger. Cambridge, Mass. 1985), pp.274-275; for a broader 
review of the integration and diversification of the transnational service sector see. United Nations 
Centre for Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development (United 
Nations, New York, 1988), pp.397-402 
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Saatchi& Saatchi), and direct marketing of service p r o d u c t s , Further 
expansions are no doubt possible and feasible which will permit more 
complex flows of transactional data between points, intensifying the 
stimulation, integration and discipline of consumption even further. 
Yet not everyone can be included in this integrated network and another 
strategy of consumer surveillance is the discipline of exclusion. It is 
now well documented that some socio-economic sectors are being 
excluded from the growing networks of electronically-mediated 
consumption. A recent Australian study showed that 17% of the adult 
population remained 'unbanked', holding no account of any type with a 
bank and are therefore do not participate in the ATM, EFTPOS, or 
credit card circuit. 69% of the unbanked population fall into the lowest 
socio-economic quintiles, earning less than $A15,000 per annum.i85 
This sector of the population are unable to pass through the consumer 
credit clearing houses and on to the circuit of electronic credit. 
Alongside the poorest who are excluded altogether, it is clear that 
participation in the circuit is very uneven and it may be argued that 
much of the international circuit of travel, credit, luxury 
accommodation and retail consumption is available to only a small 
number of affluent and mobile citizens. Though there are signs that 
corporations selling 'downmarket' products - petrol, groceries, hquor -
are now utilising EFTPOS s y s t e m s . H o w e v e r , even the partial 
participation of individuals in the system may collectively be 
transforming the social and spatial structure of consumption in ways 
which reinforce the power of the transnational service sector. For 
example, the growing popularity of ATMs is already reducing 
accessibility to local 'bricks and mortar' b r a n c h e s . 1 8 7 in addition, the 
ease of shopping and consumption provided by EFTs and EFTPOS and 
the sheer economies of scale produced by corporate operation of the 
system may further enhance the shift toward large retail dominance of 
consumption. Small shopkeepers are doubly disadvantaged. Their own 
185s. Singh, 'Changing Relationships Between Consumers and Financial Institutions', in New 
Directions in Consumer Financial Services, a National Consumer Affairs Advisory Council Forum, 
Canberra. 1990. p.80 
I86in Australia, for example, supermarkets, hardwares, and petrol stations were, by 1987, some of the 
fastest growing areas of EFTPOS. See, OECD, op cit, p.33 
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exclusion from the EFTS circuit and the disappearance of bank branches 
from local shopping centres will further reduce the popularity of local 
shopping. The acceptance of EFTPOS will intensify this trend as 
customer participation means greater ease of shopping, cheaper 
products through massive economies of scale, and customer access to 
further financial and retail incentives provided by corporate participants 
in the circuit. The new corporate combinations and forms of 
diversification which are driving consumption are producing a highly 
informated environment and allowing the permanent fine tuning of its 
operations. The provision of individual credit and loan facilities can be 
maximised through bank access to shopping transaction data providing 
details of retail consumption patterns of the same individual. On a 
broader scale, analysis of customer sales data provides details of product 
volume and type and may be matched with bank details of the 
demographic profile of EFTPOS customers resulting in a better 
targeting of product with consumer. 
These trends will accelerate the movement toward a clearly 
differentiated bisection of consumption between corporate dominated 
spaces of consumption (hypermarkets, shopping malls, and eventually 
teleshopping) replete with on-line credit and cash a c c e s s , a n d local 
shopping centres catering for the less mobile, less affluent sectors, 
excluded from the circuit. Traditionally community-based shopping 
centres have been the sites for a number of public activities centred on 
commimity needs and interests. People frequent local shopping centres 
not just for the purpose of shopping but to meet friends, visit libraries, 
attend social clubs and public meetings. The general decline in 
significance and popularity of local shopping centres over the last few 
decades, and the removal and down grading of these important social 
functions located within this space has been a result of the increasing 
corporatisation of consumption and the massive economies of scale this 
provides. The shopping mall and hypermarket present a much more 
purified space for consumption. Older community interaction is 
dissolved as consumers drive in from dispersed suburban locations and 
188it is also now argued that corporate-dominated consumption is itself bisected between suburban 
mall shopping and 'specialised, non-routine' luxury and leisure consumption gathered around the 
metropoUtan service hubs in the central business districts of large cities such as New York and London. 
Sites of executive shopping near to the headquarters of the major service corporations. See, N. Buck, 
M. Drennan and K. Newton, 'Dynamics of the Metropolitan Economy', in S.S. Fainstem, I. Gordon 
and M. Harloe, {ods.). Divided Cities (Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1992), pp.101-102. 
are confronted at every point with the images and narratives of an 
increasingly universalised culture of consumption linked, obviously, to 
ever new ranges of corporate products J 
Mike Davis' recent startling work on contemporary Los Angeles 
provides the most advanced example of the reconstitution of public 
space into a corporately operated space of consumption. In sections of 
Los Angeles a heterogeneous mix of surveillance technologies have been 
combined to purify sections of urban space for middle class 
consumption, acting as a screening process to exclude social groups 
designated unfit for participation. Combinations of electronic 
surveillance (close-circuit video surveillance, infra red beams), physical 
surveillance (private security guard foot patrols, public police 
surveillance) as well as strategically located consumption technologies 
(ATMs, EFT-POS,) with well regulated access and usage are reinforced 
by new forms of 'architectural policing', incorporating a further 'bias 
against accessibility' - security controlled private parking stations linked 
by elevated, glassed-in pedways and private appropriation of existing 
public access points. The whole surveillance 'package' is designed to 
provide 'a seamless continuum of middle class work, consumption and 
recreation', î o 
The physical exclusion of those considered unfit to participate in the 
circuits of electronically-meditated consumption is mirrored at another 
level. The informated global environment of EFT is enhancing the 
power and reach of the marketing sector of consumption. We have seen 
how new information technologies are already providing new data 
resources for the important process of consumer segmentation and 
classification. There is evidence that consumer performance data 
189 For a study of the US experience in the re-ordering of the 'spatial division of consumption' see, D. 
Harvey, The Urbanisation of Capital (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp.208-212. 
190m Davis City of Quartz (Verso, London, 1990), Chap.4. Ironically, Davis' studies of the security 
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of surveillance technologies in order to protect the privacy of the wealthy (defined in its crudest 
property form) from the destructive intrusion of the poor, the marginalised, the lawless. Systems of 
exclusion which encompass security walls, the barricading of streets, 'resident-financed guard stations', 
close-circuit video surveiUance, electronic alarm systems, personal escorts, watch patrols, supplemented 
by the 'macro-security' of police law enforcement utilising aerial surveillance, electronic taggmg 
devices attached to property and wired to police stations, and an on-line database of cnmmals and 
criminal suspects. 
derived from the integration of retailing and banking is flowing into in-
house marketing programmes, and through the clearing houses of credit 
bureaus into the databases of speciahst marketing corporations-^^! Both 
the in-house marketing arms of retailers, insurance and financial 
companies, and banks, as well as these marketing specialists, are 
increasingly utilising consumer segmentation software programmes such 
as the US-based Potential Rating Index for ZIP Markets (PRIZM) and 
Values and Lifestyles (VALS). These programmes cross-tabulate 
geodemographic and psychographic categories to produce a number of 
distinct 'lifestyle' groupings which are then assigned a consumption 
rating. For example, PRIZM involves a series of cross-tabulations in 
which the 36,000 zip codes in the US are overlain with consumer 
survey and census data to construct five basic lifestyle groupings - social 
rank, ethnicity, mobility, family life cycle, and housing style. The result 
is a set of 40 clusters of consumer identity ranked into categories of 
affluence based on age, sex, occupation, family structure, ethnic 
background, geographical location, propensity to consume, and product 
l o y a l t i e s . 1 9 2 VALS, which is used to overlay PRIZM, cross-tabulates 
even further by integrating basic psychological categories - need-driven, 
inner-directed, outer-directed, integrated, achievers, emulators, 
societaUy conscious, belongers, sustainers, and survivors - in order to 
provide a psychological dimension to the segmentation process. The 
outcome is a system of classifications which illuminates the dull mass of 
anonymous consumers into 30 or 40 social narratives designed 
specifically to fit evolving consumption p a t t e r n s . EFTS related data 
on individual consumption patterns helps to differentiate consumer 
segments even further. 
Obviously, only the higher segments (the PRIZM categories of 'blue 
blood estates', 'money and brains', and 'young influentials') interest 
marketers, retailers and advertisers. Those social groups represented in 
the lowest categories consist of the urban poor living in the materially 
and socially decimated inner cities subsisting on welfare payments 
('urban renewal') and disadvantaged rural communities ('back country 
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folks' and 'hard scrabble'), The inequalities faced by these groups are 
extended in two ways. Firstly, as the trend toward admission to the 
electronic credit circuit is decided upon statistically-based indicators of 
occupation, age, and stability of residence etc., people from the lower 
categories are excluded from entry. Secondly, it is only the higher 
consumer categories which provide the data source for the production 
of advertising imagery which appears on the screens that dot the 
consumption landscape. The excluded are unable to see their own 
lifestyles in the consumer narratives and imagery which surround them 
in their daily lives. They are thus excluded from both the material and 
ideological infrastructure which shapes and maintains consumption. 
It is clear from this survey that the surveillance potential of EFTS lies 
not just in the extension of organisational control and inter-
organisational cooperation, as maintained by Kling.i95 Or, simply in the 
extension of the frequency and quality of transactional contacts between 
organisation and client, in a way similar to that in Wilson's example of 
videotex. EFTS is deeply implicated in the emerging corporate structure 
of consumption, and its permanent expansion and intensification, along 
carefully constructed spatial and temporal patterns. Yet it is also more 
than just a process of more efficiently illuminating consumption in 
order to better manage it according to changing corporate needs. In 
many ways the combination of EFTS and the other consumption 
technologies such as videotex and direct marketing, and intensive 
consumer profiling, are leading to a coordinated disciplinary apparatus 
of consumption, which combines, in Foucault's terms, both totalising 
and individualising moments. The anonymous consuming mass is 
individualised - located, identified, targeted, profiled, seduced into 
consuming certain products at certain locations, and finally, penaUsed 
for underconsumption, overconsumption and transgressions of 
prescribed rules. As Foucault would say, individuals are circulated, 
distributed and classified - in a 'geometry of visible difference' -
according to 'precise networks of relations'. The totalising moment 
consists of mobilising the differentiated and segmented mass back into a 
combined force for consumption, increasing its mass and power by 
l94For a run down of the 40 PRIZM categories see, H. Katzenstein and W.S. Sachs, Direct Marketing 
(Charles E Merril, Columbus, Ohio, 1986), p. 147. 
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drawing in behaviours and practices thus far resistant to its pull. This 
might mean the further colonisation of domestic life, and leisure and 
sporting pursuits, or, for example, the further privatisation and 
conmiodification of health and education. Yet it is clearly not the 
discourses alone which are producing this outcome but explicit 
combinations of corporate power via a massive, and not always 
apparent, surveillance infrastructure. 
What about the state? 
Before concluding, it is important to anticipate the criticism of the 
privacy theorists that the radical thesis of surveillance is too narrowly 
concerned with the explosion of commercial surveillance, and that it 
overlooks many aspects of state surveillance practices which are not 
directly linked to capitalist discipline. This is partially true. There have 
been no systematic studies of the ways in which the capitalist state stages 
surveillance for its own disciplinary purposes. However, this does not 
mean that the liberal privacy interpretation nor the pluralist 
organisational approach are any better equipped to deal with this issue. 
A consideration of state surveillance does not alter the problems and 
deficiencies of the privacy analysis, and we have already noted how 
organisational examples of surveillance are selected arbitrarily from 
state and commercial sectors as though no real difference is expected 
between the two. Furthermore, aspects of state surveillance addressed 
by the privacy theorists are analysed in the formal framework of liberal 
theory which prescribes a limited set of functions of the state in its 
overall balance with private initiative. 
In fact it can be argued that the state is deeply impHcated in the evolving 
structure of capitalist discipline. Firstly, it is dependent on surplus 
capital for its very existence and survival and is therefore under the 
same constant pressure to expand and intensify accumulation. The state, 
beside providing and maintaining much of the material infrastructure 
which permits the efficient production and circulation of capital (eg. 
transport and communications networks), is also primarily responsible 
for the efficient reproduction of labour power. This involves providing 
education, taxation, social welfare, law and order, industrial peace, and 
managing political and social challenges to the existing socio-economic 
In fact it can be argued that the state is deeply implicated in the evolving 
structure of capitalist discipline. Firstly, it is dependent on surplus 
capital for its very existence and survival and is therefore under the 
same constant pressure to expand and intensify accumulation. The state, 
beside providing and maintaining much of the material infrastructure 
which permits the efficient production and circulation of capital (eg. 
transport and communications networks), is also primarily responsible 
for the efficient reproduction of labour power. This involves providing 
education, taxation, social welfare, law and order, industrial peace, and 
managing political and social challenges to the existing socio-economic 
framework. Yet because the provision of these services for capital is 
sourced by surplus capital there are permanent pressures to reduce 
costs. Extensive surveillance is therefore necessary for the efficient 
regulation of individual behaviour and many of the surveillance 
techniques staged by capital are followed by the state. For example, state 
departments and agencies have constructed extensive intra- and inter-
organisational data networks in order to provide a cross-system 
enforcement of bureaucratic rules and regulations, the matching and 
merging of taxation, welfare and criminal history data, and increasingly 
instantaneous, automated auditing of individuals, based on data from a 
number of departmental sources. In addition, as Wicklein and Bumham 
have indicated, statistical profiling is becoming widespread as a 
surveillance practice, reproducing the usual biases against certain social 
groups. With the introduction of unique identity numbers, individual 
transaction routes can be more easily tracked by state agencies, and data 
gathered at various points can be more easily exchanged. All these 
techniques help to enforce rules of individual performance, tying people 
closely to bureaucratic rules and regulations. As in the sphere of 
consumption, individuals can be penalised, punished, and excluded from 
state services all the more effectively. Recent studies have also pointed 
to the potential introduction of citizen 'smart cards' which will be able 
to store health, welfare, tax and criminal history data under a single 
personal identifier, allowing the updating of data at transactional 
interfaces between individuals and state agencies, and increasingly 
detailed audits of individual compHance to regulations.is^ 
196Reese op cit, p. 135 
CONCLUSION 
This study of the dominant theories of modem surveillance has aimed to 
improve the social analysis of both the purpose of its operations and the 
range of its effects. This has, firstly, meant tracing closely the social and 
political assumptions which form the basis of the 'invasion of privacy' 
interpretation. In the studies of the privacy theorists the very definition 
of surveillance and the effect of its operations are determined by the 
way in which privacy is constructed. Privacy, as a measure of 
personally owned space, and the protective barrier behind which the 
universal ideals of liberty and autonomy are sustained, lends itself 
obviously to an interpretation of surveillance as invasion or intrusion 
into that space, and equally obviously, to the distortion of these critical 
human functions. This construct had two important effects. Privacy was 
seen as a universal aspect of human existence, differing only in its scope 
within various cultures. And the necessity of, and the right to, privacy, 
across all cultures, gave it an abstract and formal quality, something 
owned by individuals irrespective of their location in the structure of 
social power. 
Secondly, this formahsing of the individual as a bearer of privacy fitted 
naturally with the formalised and abstract individualism which provides 
the base of liberal social and political theory. In the architecture of 
classical liberalism a series of balances operates in which the rights and 
obligations of legal subjects are balanced with equally specific rights and 
obligations of a public reahn charged with protecting, enhancing, and 
occasionally limiting, the liberty of private cidzens. In such an 
architecture, surveillance was considered crucial as a method of 
securing individual compliance with the administration of social good 
(centred on the protection of hberty and property). However, conditions 
of rapid technological change, deepening social complexity, and an 
increasingly mobile citizenry were leading to an expansion and 
intensification of surveillance as part of a move toward the 
bureaucratised administration of life in which unique individuals were 
being submerged into a formless mass of social atoms. In these 
circumstances excessive surveillance had to be carefully controlled if the 
rights of the individual, including privacy as the core of these rights, 
were to be salvaged. Yet in keeping with the tenets of liberal theory 
already laid out for them. And like the earlier studies, little attempt has 
been made to show just how computerised surveillance invades the 
important inner zones of privacy or why surveillance is expanding and 
intensifying. In addition, the continuing concentration on privacy 
further obscured which social groups or social functions were being 
targeted by new surveillance techniques, and for what purpose. 
The work of James Rule and his colleagues has been interpreted here as 
the beginnings of a radical critique of modem surveillance. One which 
attempted to place the massive staging of surveillance as an integral 
component of large scale social control. For Rule, bureaucratic 
organisations constantly expand and improve surveillance in order to 
better identify, locate, and control their interaction with clients for the 
optimum enforcement of organisational rules and requirements. The 
overall surveillance capacity of modem social systems depends on how 
effectively the major organisations cooperate for the mutual 
reinforcement of client control. 
However, Rule's work is limited by its pluralist approach. 
Organisations, like abstract individuals in the privacy interpretation, are 
severed from the broader structure of modem capitalist society. No 
distinction is made between private or public sector organisations, nor 
their sectoral location, whether it be production, administration or 
consumption. 
The recent work of Gandy, Wilson, Webster and Robins, Poster, and 
Davis is related more closely to Marxist social theory and seeks to 
identify the ways in which new surveillance practices are embedded in 
the maintenance of social exploitation and the evolving requirements of 
capital accumulation. Gandy and Wilson move beyond organisational 
pluralism and point to new combinations of corporate power utilising 
new information and communication technologies - consumer profiling, 
direct marketing, videotex - to mobiUse and direct individual behaviour 
along lines beneficial to corporate needs. Their studies show how 
surveillance operates to reinforce and extend the uneven distribution of 
social power, further excluding the economically and politically 
disenfranchised. Webster and Robins adapt Foucault's metaphor of the 
panopticon to contemporary conditions of electronic panopticism in 
new information and communication technologies - consumer profiling, 
direct marketing, videotex - to mobilise and direct individual behaviour 
along lines beneficial to corporate needs. Their studies show how 
surveillance operates to reinforce and extend the uneven distribution of 
social power, further excluding the economically and politically 
disenfranchised. Webster and Robins adapt Foucault's metaphor of the 
panopticon to contemporary conditions of electronic panopticism in 
which corporately operated networks of data flow from centre to a 
multitude of peripheral nodes located in homes, workplaces, shops, sites 
of consumption in order to discipline individual performance around 
shifting conmiercial requirements. Finally, in the brief study of EFTS 
the technological and social threads of contemporary surveillance -
intensifying corporate combinations, instantaneous, automated tracking 
of consumer movement, the disciplinary mobilisation of consumers 
along specific corporate routes, and the classification of product-related 
consumer identities - are brought together in the complex shaping of 
individual behaviour which characterises the hidden processes behind 
the information landscape of late capitalism. 
Modem surveillance is much more than the simple invasion of privacy 
or the unspecified application of social control. Its operations are 
intimately linked to the growing integration of individuals into the 
mechanisms of late capitalist social power. The recent ebbing of 
organised resistance to this power will, in the immediate future at least, 
ensure that new elaborations of technology, surveillance and discipline 
are relatively free to tie everyday patterns of social life even more 
closely to the expanding circuits of capital. 
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